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ABSTRACT
The following study examines the NDP's relationship with
labour.

Historically, NDP labour relations have been tenuous

at best.

In the 1990s, however, this relationship has been

seriously threatened.

The aim of this study is to probe into

how NDP- labour relations have functioned in the past, and how
they might evolve in the future.
CCF-NDP

The first chapter reviews

relations with labour from 1932 to 1988.

followed by
necessary

This is

a literature review designed to provide the
background on NDP-labour relations.

Chapter three

looks at the nature of NDP-labour relations and their impact
on the

NDP's electoral fortunes in the 1993 federal election

campaign.

The fourth chapter

examines how NDP-labour

relations have evolved following the 1993 federal election.
As well, included in this chapter is

an alternative

structural model for the NDP designed to not only strengthen
NDP-labour relations, but to also increase the party's
electoral competitiveness.

Finally, chapter five

summarizes the study's main points and arguments.

in

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

DEDICATION

This paper is dedicated to my parents, whose support and
encouragement kept me sane during difficult times.

iv

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my committee:

Professor R- Krause,

Professor R. Wagenberg, and Professor L. Glassford, for their
time, advice, and patience.

I would also like to

thank Professor H. Pawley for providing me with a wide array
of labour discussion papers and NDP documents.

v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OE CONTENTS

Abstract

iii

Dedication

iv

Acknowledgements

v

Introduction

1

Chapter One:

NDP-Labour Relations. 1932-1988

6

Social Democracy in Canada
The Labour Movement in Canada: 1932-1940
CCF-Labour Relations:
1940-1945
The Transition from CCF to NDP: 1946-1962
The Unionism of the 1950s
The Founding of the New Democratic Party
NDP-Labour Relations:
1963-1988
The Transformation of Labour in Canada
Conclusion

9
12
17
22
25
27
33
40
43

Chapter Two:

52

Literature Review

The Political Party: A Theoretical Perspective
Party Structure
Party Leadership
The NDP in Quebec:
Le Neant
Ideology and the NDP
The N D P ’s Relationship With Labour
Conclusion

53
56
62
64
66
72
86

Chapter Three:

95

The 1993 Federal Election

Voting Behaviour
The 1993 Election Campaign
Conclusion

97
105
116

Chapter Four:

121

NDP-Labour Relations After 1993

The Social Contract: The NDP-Labour Relationship
in crisis
The 1995 Ontario Provincial Election
A Formula For Success: The NDP in Saskatchewan
NDP-Labour Relations: British Columbia
The Future of NDP-Labour Relations
Conclus ion

122
128
133
135
137
151

Chapter Five:

159

Bibliography

Conclusion

165

Vita Auctoris

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

NDP-LABOUR RELATIONS: CRISES AND CHALLENGES IN THE 1990S

INTRODUCTION
The electoral setback suffered by the NDP during the 1993
federal election has forced the party to re-examine its
relationship with organized labour.

Labour, too, has felt

compelled to re-evaluate its relationship with the NDP.
Most social democratic parties have close ties with labour.
The central premise of this study, however, that a similar
relationship in Canada

has not been as strong; and in the

1990s it is under attack.

From a topical standpoint, this

study identifies and analyzes the problems which have
historically plagued NDP-labour relations.
The first chapter of this study looks at the
evolutionary development of CCF-NDP relations with organized
labour between 1932-1988.

This chapter presents data on

CCF-NDP electoral fortunes and reviews the financial and
electoral support that labour has given to the party.

It

also includes data which lists the numbers of union locals
affiliated to the NDP as well as the rules outlining union
affiliation.
The second chapter is a review of the literature from
1988 to 1995.

The literature reviewed comes from various

books, newspapers, labour discussion papers, and NDP renewal
conference material.

In addition to revealing material

regarding NDP-labour relations, this chapter includes
material which probes into such topics as party leadership,

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the NDP in Quebec, party structure, and how New Democrats
define themselves and their rcle within the NDP.

In

addition to exposing the relevant issues which have shaped
the nature of NDP-labour relations, this chapter also looks
at the issues which have caused intra-party conflict and
NDP-labour strife.
Chapter three examines NDP-labour relations during the
1993 federal election campaign.

Specifically, it looks at

the reasons responsible for NDP-labour tensions during the
federal election campaign.

As an important background, this

chapter includes a discussion of the various factors which
have influenced voting behaviour in Canada.

Additionally,

it compares the political attitudes of union voters to union
leaders to shed light on why so few trade unionists voted
for the NDP in 1993.
The fourth chapter examines and evaluates, in detail,
one of the root causes for NDP-labour tensions - the Ontario
NDP government’s Social Contract Act (Bill 48).

In

addition, this chapter examines the records of provincial
NDP governments which have governed in Canada during the
1990s.

Lastly, this chapter uses the transaction theory as

an aid in producing an alternative structural model for the
NDP.

The transaction theory facilitates in the

understanding of the factors which have influenced NDPlabour relations during the 1990s.

Ralph Goldman contends

that the main premise behind the transaction theory is that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"when persons contribute effort and action to an organized
group, they are giving something in the expectation of
receiving something else..."(1)

Not only do both parties

have to profit from an exchange, a high degree of trust
towards each other is also required in order to carry out a
successful transaction.
The political transactions which occur between parties,
called currencies, are divided into three categories:
Shares (decisional elements); incumbencies (positional
elements); and commodities (materiel exchanges).

Decisional

elements refer to an individual’s influence within the
decision making process of an organization.(2)

Positional

elements describe when individuals contribute to a group
with the expectation of personal reward in return, for
instance, job patronage as a reward for party service.(3)
Finally, materiel exchanges describe the exchange of
materials, most notably money, as an instrument for
achieving an individual's goals.(4)
It will be argued that by implementing structural
changes the NDP can create a party in which the channels of
communication between it and labour are enhanced.

As a

result, trust will be restored, both parties will profit
from exchanges, and successful transactions will take place.
By creating an environment which encourages transactions to
occur, cooperation between the NDP and labour will be
expanded, conflict reduced, and political integration

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

4

enhanced.

Therefore, the transaction theory can help to

explain why NDP-labour relations have been tenuous and
controversial in the past and how they can be improved upon,
through structural changes, in the future.
The fifth, and final, chapter includes a brief review
of all key concepts and issues as they pertain to NDP-labour
relations. This chapter will also reiterate the main
arguments of the study.
The following chapters will clearly show why NDP-labour
strife is detrimental
organizations.

to the interests of both

In order to survive as a credible political

entity, the NDP must have labour’s endorsement,
soldiers, and its financial contributions.

its foot

Furthermore, the

labour movement, particularly those unions most unhappy with
the NDP (the Canadian Auto Workers and most public sector
unions), should not abandon the party or divert their
resources to extra-parliamentary social coalitions.
follow such an approach would only lesson labour’s
effectiveness to influence public policy.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ENDNOTES
1.

Ralph M. Goldman, Contemporary Perspectives On Politics
(New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1972),p.l28.

2.

Ibid., p.128.

3.

Ibid., p.153.

4.

Ibid., p.154.
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CCF-NDP RELATIONS WITH LABOUR:

1932-1988

CHAPTER ONE
This chapter will examine CCF-NDP relations with
organized labour from 1932 to 1988.

It will be argued that

the party's leadership saw trade union support, specifically
in Ontario, as necessary to expand beyond its western base
of support.

However, the voting behaviour of union members

is only one of many factors which must be considered.

The

number of local unions affiliated to the NDP and labour's
financial contributions to the party are also important.
Historically, less than encouraging results at the
ballot box have been interpreted a number of different ways.
Positions

in the trade unions and the party range from

severing ties at one extreme, to strengthening ties at the
other.

The controversy surrounding this debate has

persisted within the union movement and the party since the
1930s.

By contrast,

most social democratic parties in

other countries have enjoyed stronger and more harmonious
relations with their labour allies.

What, then, are the

factors which make social democracy unique in Canada?

To

answer this question, this chapter will include comparisons
between the CCF-NDP and the British Labour party.
The trade union movement in Canada must also be
examined carefully.

Trade unionists have long held

differing views with regard to their role in politics.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The

7

organizational structure of the trade union movement will
also be reviewed.

This is necessary because it will further

illustrate that organized labour is not a monolithic entity.
According to Freeman and Medoff:

"Trade Unions are the

principal institutions of workers in modern capitalist
societies."(1)

Although this definition is accepted, it

will be clearly shown that these institutions differ
substantially

from one another.

Specifically, divisions

between industrial and craft unions during the thirties and
forties, and tensions between national and international
unions during the sixties and seventies will be discussedIt is these differences within the labour movement that have
shaped labour's sometimes controversial relationship with
the CCF and its successor, the NDP.
To discuss these issues in a clear and concise manner,
this chapter will be divided into three parts.

Part one

will focus on organized labour's relationship with the party
from 1932 to 1945.

Moreover, it is here where social

democracy will be defined and how it has been able to find
its place in Canadian politics.

This is also a period where

the CCF leadership attempted to obtain labour's support in
Central Canada.

As for the trade union movement in Canada,

historically it has been seriously divided on the issue of
direct political action.
and analyzed.

These divisions will be uncovered

This chapter will also explain why the 1943

endorsement of the CCF by the Canadian Congress of Labour

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

s

(CCL) as the "political arm of labour,"(2) failed to result
in electoral gains for the party in Canada's industrial
heartland.

Finally, the influence of the Communist party

within the trade union movement and its impact during the
1945 federal election will be discussed.
Part two of this chapter will cover the period from
1946 to 1962.

Emphasis will be placed on the CCF's gradual

shift away from socialism, as described in the Regina
Manifesto, towards the more politically moderate Winnipeg
Declaration of Principles in 1956-

It will be argued that

through moderation the CCF hoped to gain greater union
support.

As well, during this period significant changes

within the trade union movement directly influenced partylabour relations.

The merger between the Trades and Labour

Congress (TLC) and the CCL helped unify labour's voice in
Canada.

Furthermore, the growing numbers of unionized

workers during this period led to a more confident and
politically active labour movement.

It is these changes,

both within the party and the labour movement, which made it
possible for the founding of the New Democratic party in
1961.
Finally, Part three will review the NDP's relationship
with labour from 1963 to 1988.

This section will include

statistical information on NDP electoral fortunes, with
particular attention given to the voting behaviour of trade
unionists.

Moreover, the question of whether or not the
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transformation of the CCF into the NDP has benefitted the
party will be discussed.

This section ends at 1988 because

it was during this period when serious cracks first appeared
between labour and the party over electoral strategy.

Many

prominent trade unionists criticized the NDP for not
focussing on the Free Trade debate.

Additionally, it will

be shown that during this period formal ties between the NDP
and labour, by way of affiliation, have made up only a small
percentage of Canada's total union membership.

Furthermore,

these trade unionists have not been shown to favour the NDP
over the Liberals or Conservatives during election time.

Part 1.
Social Democracy in Canada
In 1932 the decision to create the Co-operative
Commonwealth Federation (CCF) was taken.

The following year

at its first National Convention, the CCF adopted the Regina
Manifesto, which outlined the party's principles and
objectives.

The Regina Manifesto was intended to offer

Canadians something radically different from what the two
traditional parties had been offering.

The founders of the

CCF believed that the Depression demonstrated that
capitalism had failed.

They proposed "The establishment of

a planned, socialized economic order, in order to make
possible the most efficient development of the natural
resources and the most equitable distribution of the
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national income."(3).

The membership of the CCF consisted

of various farmer, labour and socialist groups.

These

groups were united in their belief that changes were
necessary to reverse the human misery caused by the
Depression.
When compared to social democratic parties in other
English-speaking countries, the CCF was certainly unique.
Its Manifesto was far more radical than the British Labour
Party's.

For example, the final paragraph of the Regina

Manifesto states:

"No CCF Government will rest content

until it has eradicated capitalism and put into operation
the full programme of socialized planning which will lead to
the establishment in Canada of the Co-operative
Commonwealth."(4)

By contrast, the British Labour party did

not fully support socialism nor did it recognize the class
struggle as the motor of social change.(5)

Referring to the

British labour movement, Henry Pelling contends that "...the
comparative prosperity of the employed workers in the late
nineteenth century limited the success of the Socialists'
appeal."(6)

Moreover, as the name would suggest, the

British Labour Party (BLP) was heavily influenced by the
British trade unions.

It was labourism that had influenced

the creation of the BLP.

Labourism, unlike socialism, was

concerned with the improvement of life for the working class
rather than replacing capitalism with socialism.(7)
There are two reasons why social democracy evolved
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differently in Canada than in Great Britain.
during the 1930s, was

First, Canada

mainly a rural and agrarian country.

Less than 15 percent of the country’s urban workforce was
unionized.(8)

Therefore, the creation of a major national

labour party in Canada was not a realistic objective.
Second, the trade union movement was fragmented and, for the
most part, uninterested in involving itself with politics.
For example, the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (TLC),
the largest union organization in the country during the
1930s, followed in the traditions of the American Federation
of Labor (AFL), choosing to remain "...independent of any
political organization"(9)

Thus, a lack of

political

interest within the labour movement, combined with a small
unionized workforce, differentiated Canadian social
democracy from that of Great Britain.
At first, the mainly rural roots of the CCF rendered it
irrelevant in Canada's industrial heartland-

Participating

in its first federal election in 1935, the CCF won only
seven seats.(10)

Moreover, the party failed to win a single

seat east of Manitoba.

In fact, the CCF ran no candidates

in the Maritimes and obtained only eight percent of the
popular vote in Ontario and less than one percent of the
popular vote in Quebec.(11)

The CCF leadership realized

that more had to be done in order to obtain trade union
support.

The major problem facing the CCF was that there

were no formal rules for trade unions to affiliate with the
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party.

The CCF's leadership understood that the party was a

coalition of various interests.

If rules for union

affiliation were established, then it was important that
they not allow labour to gain a dominant position within the
party.

The CCF was forced to deal with this issue when on

August 15th, 1938 District 26 of the United Mine workers
(UMW) voted to affiliate with the party.(12)

To prevent the

possibility of eventual union domination, the party allowed
affiliation to occur only at the local union level.
well, the

As

rules outlining union representation were

designed to severely limit labour's voice within the party.
Instead of following the practices of the British Labour
party which allowed block voting and block representation,
the CCF formulated a system that gave unions less
representation per capita than their constituency
organizations.(13)

As a result, union representation within

the CCF and its successor, the NDP, was always limited
whereas within the BLP trade union membership was
dominant.(14) Thus, union support was desired by the CCF.
However, union control was not.

The Labour Movement in Canada:

1932-1940

Formal ties by way of affiliation between labour and
the CCF were, for the most part, non-existent during this
period.
the CCF.

There was very little incentive to affiliate with
The party appeared a long way from becoming a
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significant political force in Canada,

why, then, would a

trade union local want to support and financially contribute
to a party that had little chance of being elected?

By

affiliating with the CCF some trade unionists feared that
their ability to lobby the traditional parties would be
damaged.

Therefore, many union leaders believed that

affiliation would hinder labour's interests rather than
advance them.

To better understand this issue it is

necessary to review the developments occurring within the
trade union movement during this period.
In Canada there were two opposing philosophies that
emerged within the labour movement during the 1930s.(15)
The first paralleled closely with the politically active
role that trade unions played in Britain.

This perspective

was imported to Canada by British immigrants.

These

immigrants were able to influence the trade union movement
in Canada because they were not considered as foreigners in
English-speaking Canada.

According to Gad Horowitz, their

political views were accepted because English Canada's
political culture already contained non-liberal elements,
such as toryism, within it.(16)

The second view to emerge

was modelled after the American example which followed the
Gomperist approach of political non-alignment.

Samuel

Gompers, a prominent American labour leader, believed that
labour should not support certain political parties over
others.

Rather, he believed that labour should support only
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those individual politicians who would advance labour's
wishes.

While the smaller All-Canadian Congress of Labour

(ACCL) followed the former philosophy, the TLC favoured the
latter.
Complicating matters for the CCF was the fact that the
two organizations were bitter rivals.

The ACCL, after all,

was established by a number of unions that were expelled
from the TLC.

The animosity between the two groups was

public and well understood by the leaders of the CCF.

The

CCF, therefore, attempted to cautiously build a relationship
with the ACCL without isolating the much larger TLC.
The second, and more serious, problem facing the CCF
came from the Communist Party.

Although the CCF's

constitution prohibited the admission of individuals
belonging to another party, it feared Communist infiltration
through trade union affiliation.

This concern was well

founded. Since the 1920s the Communists were actively
organizing workers.

Communist Party members created the

Workers Unity League (WUL) which brought an estimated 25,000
unorganized workers into industrial unions by 1935.(17)

By

organizing workers, the Communists attempted to gain a
prominent voice within the Canadian trade union movement.
To successfully achieve this objective, WUL activists, on
instructions from the Communist party, began merging their
unions into the A F L . (18)
The CCF, and its sympathizers within the labour

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15

movement, were also organizing workers.

Not surprisingly,

the Communists and the CCF soon became intense rivals, as
both political organizations claimed to be the party best
suited to represent labour's interests.

In the United

States, the AFL grew increasingly concerned over the growth
and political orientation of these newer industrial unions.
After suspending them for one year, the AFL expelled these
organizations entirely in 1937.(19)

The expelled unions

then created their own organization independent from the AFL
called the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).

The

rift between the AFL and some of its industrial unions soon
spilled over into Canada.

Following their decision in the

United States, the AFL successfully pressured their Canadian
affiliate, the TLC, to expel all CIO unions from its
organization as well.
By the beginning of 1940, the CIO unions and the ACCL
began holding meetings over the possibility of a merger
between the two organizations.

From these meetings came an

eventual agreement to create the Canadian Congress of Labour
(CCL).

The new Congress elected a prominent Canadian labour

union leader, Aaron Mosher, as its first president.(20)

The

election of Mosher as president of the CCL was expected to
have a positive impact on CCF-Labour relations.

In 1932,

Mosher attended the Calgary Conference as the president of
the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees.

It was here

where Mosher, along with various other farmer, labour and
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socialist groups announced the founding of the CCF.

Thus,

there was no secret where the loyalties of the CCL's
president lay.

However, since only union locals, rather

than federations or councils could affiliate with the CCF,
Mosher's role, and the impact of other CCF members within
the CCL executive, was limited.

In other words, the CCL did

not have the authority to command its members to affiliate
with the CCF.

Additionally, many of the former CIO unions

were Communist led or influenced.

These unions were not

only unsympathetic towards the CCF, they were also the
party’s most serious political competitors.
Clearly, then, during the latter half of the 1930s
there

were major changes occurring within the trade union

movement.

First, there was the growth of industrial unions,

which were beginning to rival the size and strength of the
older craft unions.

Second, Communist influence and

involvement within these newer unions posed a direct
challenge to the CCF in their drive to secure labour’s
support.

Finally, despite the efforts made by the CCF to

gain trade union support, only one union, UMW District 26,
affiliated with the CCF by 1940.
The party's failure to attract trade union support was
reflected in the 1940 federal election results when it won
only eight seats.

More serious was the party's showing in

Ontario.

Not only did the CCF fail to win a seat in

Ontario,

but it also saw its support slide to 3.8 percent
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of the vote, down significantly from the 8 percent showing
that it received during the 1935 federal election.(21)
Although the CCF's failure to obtain labour's support was
not the only factor responsible for its weak showing, the
party's leadership nevertheless realized that substantial
policy changes were needed to obtain trade union support.

CCF-Labour Relations:

1940-1945

CCF-Labour relations would change dramatically during
the war years.

Unlike the Depression years of the 1930s

when many labour unions were weak and timid, full employment
as a result of the war increased the size and the strength
of the industrial unions.

The CCF also benefited from the

war because their message for a larger governmental role in
the economy was not considered as radical during the war
years as it was during the 1930s.

The Liberals, after all,

had been intervening and regulating the economy to fulfil
Canada's obligations for the war effort.

It appeared the

CCF's leadership, sensing the opportunity for making serious
political gains had materialized, began to modify its
message in order to attract the growing middle class and the
trade unions.
The CCF's steady rise in the polls produced immediate
benefits for the party.

Now that the party was considered a

political contender, labour appeared to be moving closer to
it.

Interestingly, the CCL's

endorsement of the CCF in
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September 1943 occurred at about the same time that a Gallup
Poll placed the CCF ahead of both the Liberals and the
Conservatives.

Increasing popularity combined with the

CCL's endorsement led to a substantial rise in the number of
unions which chose to affiliate with the CCF.

By 1944 the

CCF had 100 union locals with approximately 50,000 members
affiliated to the party.(22)

However, the party's rules

outlining union affiliation prevented labour from obtaining
a dominant position within the CCF.

During the 1944

national convention only 19 out of 208 delegates were from
affiliated union locals.(23)
At the CCF's 1944 national convention it soon became
clear

that the party was not as eager to follow the

socialist dogma which dominated the pages of the Regina
Manifesto.

The CCF’s national secretary, David Lewis, was

instrumental in steering the party away from its socialist
roots.

Not all CCFers, however, were happy with the

proposed changes.
reported:

On November 30, 1944 the Windsor Star

"Manifesto Changes Stir Hot Dispute Between

Factions at Convention."

The debate was centred around the

statement within section six of the 1944 Manifesto regarding
the issue of social ownership which read:

"The

socialization and democratic control, under either public or
co-operative ownership, of key industries which are
monopolistic in operation..."(24)

By this statement the

party appeared to be abandoning its commitment to
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"eradicate” capitalism.
stating:

The Manifesto went even further by

"The socialization of large-scale enterprise,

however, does not mean taking over every private
business."(25)

Obviously, replacing capitalism with

socialism was no longer a stated CCF objective.
While the 1944 Manifesto was threatening to divide the
CCF, the CCL supported the more moderate position being
conveyed by the party.

Labour, for the most part, had

always tended to be "more conservative" than the CCF, and
consequently the party's changes bridged some of the
ideological differences which existed between the two
organizations.(26)

The majority of Canada's trade unions

were not opposed to capitalism as it had existed during this
period.

The party's overtures to labour, however, did not

translate into overwhelming electoral support.

The

governing Liberals, led by Mackenzie King, took a number of
CCF ideas and used them as their own.

In 1940, the Liberals

passed the Unemployment Insurance Act, and in 1944

they

made a key concession to labour when they established by
Order-in-Council compulsory bargaining rights.(27)

The

major advantage that the Liberals had over the CCF was that
they were the governing party.

In this position the

Liberals had the power to demonstrate, with legislative
action, their promises whereas the CCF could not.

When in

1945 the Liberals called an election many Canadians,
including trade unionists, saw no need to take a chance with
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an inexperienced group of CCFers when the more experienced
Liberals appeared equally committed to implementing many of
the same programs.
In addition to the Liberal party, the CCF had the
Communist challenge to contend with.

As mentioned, there

■were many Communist-led unions within the CCL.

Their

opposition to the CCF disrupted the possible development of
closer ties between the two organizations.

As early as

1940, the Communists attempted to seize control of the CCL
executive when at its first national convention Nigel
Morgan, the Communist regional director of the CIO in
Vancouver, ran against

Aaron Mosher for the presidency.

Although Mosher did win the election with 283 votes, Morgan
still managed to receive the support of 175 delegates.(28)
Morgan’s defeat, however, did not diminish the Communist
presence or influence within the CCL.

In the following

years, the Communists successfully attacked the credibility
of the CCL's newly created Political Action Committees
(PAC).

The PACs were set up to persuade the rank and file

to vote for the CCF.

The impact of Communist opposition

towards the PACs ultimately hindered their role
substantially.

Consequently, and unfortunately for the CCF,

overt Communist opposition toward the PACs contributed to
the party's disappointing electoral performance in 1945.
The Communists went even further in challenging the
CCF.

Not only were they opposing closer ties between the
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CCL and the CCF, they founded a new party called the LaborProgressive party (LPP) in 1943.

The LPP

was created to

offer trade unionists a political alternative to the CCF.
The LPP supported class collaboration, it asked unions to
support a no strike pledge, and it promised to support the
Liberal government.(29)

The LPP's stance was based on the

belief that the federal government should be aided in its
war effort

to defeat fascism.

It was the fascist states,

after all, which posed the greatest threat to Communism with
the German invasion of the Soviet Union.

For this reason,

the Communist International favoured class collaboration in
order to help defeat the Axis powers. The Liberals, for the
most part,

recognized that there were political advantages

associated by allying themselves with the Communists in
certain regions.

For example, in cities such as Windsor,

the Liberal-LPP alliance was desirable because the city’s
largest union, the United Auto Workers, was sympathetic to
the Communists.(30) Consequently, during the 1945 election
campaign, the Liberals agreed to allow candidates endorsed
by the LPP to run under the Liberal-Labour banner in
Windsor.
Thus, as the 1945 federal election campaign was coming
to an end, the CCF could not obtain the overwhelming support
that it needed from the labour movement.

Although the CCL

endorsed the CCF as the political arm of labour, few unions
ever did affiliate with the party.

Furthermore, the
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Liberals had skilfully managed to gain the support of most
of the TLC and CCL unions shortly before the election.(31)
The Liberals were ultimately successful because they made a
series of key legislative concessions to organized labour.
Moreover, the party's main rival from the left, the
Communists,

had managed to frustrate the development of

closer ties between the CCF and the CCL.

During the

election campaign the Communists challenged the CCF in many
electoral ridings.

Not surprisingly, the CCF failed to make

the impact its leaders had expected during the initial weeks
of the election campaign.

The final electoral results on

June 11, 1945, revealed that the Liberals had won 125 seats,
the Conservatives 67 seats, and the CCF 28 seats.(32) As
well, the CCF which had once led in the opinion polls in
1943, received only 15.6 percent of the popular vote in
1945. (33)

Part 2.
The Transition From CCF to NDP:

1946-1962

In many ways, the dramatic changes occurring within
Canadian society contributed to the transition of the CCF
into the NDP.

The end of the Second World War did not lead

to a return of the economic conditions of the 1930s, as the
CCF had warned.

Realizing this, the party was forced to

adjust to the economic realities of post-war Canadian
society.

Although many CCFers were divided over how to make
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their party more attractive, one view eventually prevailed.
The party bureaucrats believed that a move towards the
political centre would make it more attractive to the
growing numbers of people who

made up the middle-class.

well, the labour movement was

also undergoing dramatic

changes.

As

The advent of the Cold War led to a major purge of

the Communists within the trade unions.
labour movement emerged after

Additionally, the

the war larger and with

expectations to expand its membership in the new industrial
economy.

As a result of these changes, the CCF hoped to

establish closer links with organized labour as a way to
improve its electoral fortunes.
In a report outlining the CCF's role in Parliament
during the 1946 session, it is clear that the party wanted
to demonstrate its value to labour.

Not surprisingly,

missing in this document were any reference to the socialist
dogma that dominated CCF material in the past.

The party's

position on labour issues were discussed in the following
manner:
The 1946 session, like all previous sessions,
showed clearly that labour has no voice in
Parliament other than its Party, the CCF
In
addition to fighting the immediate struggle of
labour, the CCF members continued to demand
a national labour code to ensure genuine
collective bargaining, union security, higher
wage levels and improved working conditions.(34)
Thus, despite the CCF's failure to receive a significant
level of union support during the 1945 election, it was
still prepared to convey a pro-labour image-

By the late
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1940s many of the obstacles hindering the development of
closer ties between the CCF and labour were being removed.
The Communists, who had been such formidable foes of the
CCF, were now being removed from the unions.

Fortunately

for the CCF, the Communists had the ill-fortune of being
associated with the foreign policies of the Soviet
Union.(35)

As a result, the CCF was able to fill the void

left by the Communists and therefore increase its influence
within the CCL.
The continuation of economic prosperity, however,
continued to have a negative impact on the electoral
fortunes of the CCF.

During the 1949 federal election the

party won only 13 seats, a decline of 15 seats from
1945.(36)

Although winning 23 seats in 1953, the CCF's

share of the popular continued to decline.

In 1953 the

party won 11.3 percent of the popular vote, which was a drop
2.1 percent from 1949.(37)

The electoral setbacks suffered

by the CCF signalled to the party's leadership that major
changes were needed.
The party's national executive drafted and presented to
the 1956 convention the Winnipeg Declaration of Principles.
Unlike other CCF documents, such as the 1944 Election
Manifesto, the Winnipeg Declaration of Principles was
significant because it was intended to replace the
objectives and principles outlined in the Regina Manifesto.
The differences between the two documents were remarkable.
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Whereas the Regina Manifesto asserted that "No CCF
Government will rest until it has eradicated capitalism...'*
the final paragraph of the Winnipeg Declaration stated the
following:
The CCF will not rest content until every
person in this land and in all other lands
is able to enjoy equality and freedom, a
sense of human dignity, and an opportunity
to live a rich and meaningful life as a
citizen of a free and peaceful world.(38)
Apparently, then, the CCF accepted the notion that
capitalism could be reformed rather than replaced by
socialism.

In a style which closely resembled that of the

two traditional parties, the Winnipeg Declaration was an
ambiguous document.

Moreover, it contained little

ideological content when compared to its predecessor, the
Regina Manifesto.

The Unionism of the 1950s
The CCF’s move toward the political centre paralleled
closely a series of changes occurring within the labour
movement.
state.

Labour appeared increasingly satisfied with the

It had won collective bargaining rights, and as the

economy continued to grow so, too, did union membership.
From 1945 to 1955 the number of Canadians belonging to trade
unions rose from 15.7 per cent to 23.6 per cent of the
country’s workforce.(39)

Having won most of the rights it

had fought for during the war years, the labour movement
became increasingly complacent.

Nowhere was this more
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evident than in the CCL.

It was the CCL, after all, that

had been the most vocal advocate of union rights during the
war years.

The prosperity attained during the post-war era

meant that the CCL was satisfied by simply lobbying the
Liberals or Conservatives for further concessions.

The fact

that this strategy following the traditional methods used by
the TLC narrowed the differences between these two union
organizations.
In addition, the removal of the Communists also paved
the way towards organizational unity between the TLC and the
CCL.

Particularly in the CCL, the Communists had wielded

tremendous influence both within its organization and
amongst its union affiliates.

As late as 1946, for example,

ten of the CCL's twenty-three unions, representing
approximately one-third of the organization's membership,
were either Communist-led or influenced.(40)

The advent of

the Cold War led to the expulsion of the Communists from the
CCL.

Soon thereafter the CCL and the TLC approached one

another to discuss the possibility of a merger.
In December 1953, a Unity Committee consisting of
representatives from the TLC and the CCL was
established.(41)

In 1956, after two years of joint

discussions, the TLC and the CCL merged to form the Canadian
Labour Congress (CLC).

This new union organization united

approximately three-quarters of Canada's labour
movement.(42)

More importantly for the CCF, the executive
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council of the CLC contained a number of CCFers.

Thus, it

was to no surprise that the CCF, equipped with a more
moderate political platform, and the CLC, more receptive to
the party’s more moderate stance, established a joint
political committee in 1958.

Eventually this committee

became known as the National Committee for the New Party.
Thus, the seeds were planted for the creation of a new
political party in Canada.

The Founding of the New Democratic Party
Not all CCFers were keen on the idea of forming a new
political party with closer links to organized labour-

As

early as 1945 many within the party saw labour as a
hinderance to the movement rather than a valuable ally.
Although the party bureaucrats, led by Lewis, were able to
move the CCF towards the political centre, the left-wing of
the party continued to voice its misgivings.

For example,

Carlyle King, the President of the Saskatchewan CCF, was
quoted for saying in the Canadian' Forum the following:
The trouble is that socialist parties
have gone a-whoring after the Bitch
Goddess. They have wanted Success,
Victory, Power; forgetting that the
main business of socialist parties is
not to form governments but to change
minds. When people begin to concentrate
on success at the polls, they become
careful and cautious; and when they
become careful and cautious, the virtue
goes out of them.(43)
King’s assessment is interesting because he criticizes the
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party for becoming too preoccupied with seeking to improve
its electoral fortunes.

If this was truly the objective of

the party's leaders, then they failed miserably during the
1950s.
As mentioned, the CCF won 28 seats during the 1945
federal election campaign.

Despite closer CCF-labour

relations during the 1950s, the party failed to make
significant gains at the ballot box.

Certainly, changes in

the CCF's platform, and closer ties with labour, are not the
sole factors for the party's declining electoral fortunes.
However, during this period, the CCF did begin to experience
an erosion of its traditional base of support in mainly
rural Saskatchewan.

In that province the party saw its

number of federal seats decline from 18 in 1945
in 1949.(44)

to a mere 5

Although making a slight comeback during the

1953 and 1957 federal elections, by the 1958 campaign the
party had only one seat remaining in Saskatchewan.
Similarly, the CCF's share of the popular also fell
dramatically.

In 1949, for instance, the CCF had 44.4

percent of the popular vote in Saskatchewan.(45)

In 1958,

though, the CCF's share of the popular vote in Saskatchewan
had fallen to 28.4 percent.(46)

Unfortunately for the CCF,

while it lost a significant portion of the farm vote, it
failed to make strong electoral gains at the federal level
in the provinces with sizable unionized populations, such as
Ontario and British Columbia.
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With the CCF reduced to only 8 seats during the 1958
federal election, the party's leadership began working on
yet another political strategy.

For the party's leaders

this meant moulding the CCF in a manner that would make it
attractive to the growing numbers of middle-class Canadians
and trade unionists.

After two years of ongoing discussions

with the CLC, the CCF endorsed the creation of the New Party
at its 1960 convention.(47)

Some party members, however,

argued that the CCF would become dominated by trade
unionists and consequently these newer members would move
the CCF further towards the political centre.

Indeed,

reformism was far more attractive to most union leaders
within the CLC than socialism.(48)

Fears of union

domination appeared very real because of the comments being
made by many prominent CCFers.
Knowles stated

For instance, Stanley

the following in 1961:

"...one of the main

reasons the New Party is coming into being is because labour
wishes a more effective means...for making its contribution
to the political life of this nation."(49)

The CCF was

eager to establish such a relationship with labour because
it was expected to provide the party with much needed
financial support and long-term electoral success.

As well,

the party's leadership felt that labour represented the
working class and therefore was the natural ally of a leftof-centre party.
The transition from CCF to NDP was not an entirely
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smooth one.

Walter Pitman, for example, won a federal seat

while running as a New Party candidate during a 1960 byelection. Although Pitman's election was prior to the NDP's
founding convention, scheduled for August 1961, the CCF's
parliamentary caucus seriously considered not recognizing
Pitman as a caucus member.(50)

The house leader of the CCF,

Hazen Argue from Saskatchewan, along with many of the
party's caucus members were not supportive of the New Party
proposal.

Argue challenged the party bureaucrats by first

running against their choice for leader, Tommy Douglas, and
then by publicly saying that he would quit the NDP because
"a clique of Trade unionists"(51) had captured the party.
Thus, there were concerns over organized labour's
influence in the NDP.

Ultimately, however, these concerns

were alleviated because there were few structural
differences between the CCF and the NDP.

The rules

outlining union representation continued to guarantee the
supremacy of the constituency association over local union
affiliates.

Additionally,

there was not an overwhelming

number of union locals which chose to affiliate with the NDP
soon after it was founded.

Although the CLC was

enthusiastic over the creation of the new party, it had no
authority to require its unions to affiliate with the NDP,
and most chose not to.
Although the founding of the NDP in August 1961 did not
lead to a significant number of local unions

deciding to
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affiliate, this was not a'major concern for the party.
Affiliation fees were not the major source of union
contributions, nor did they represent a significant portion
of the party's overall budget.

The party's leadership, in

fact, sought closer ties with labour because they thought it
would translate into rank and file union support for the
party during election time.

Although many trade unionists

did become avid party members and valuable volunteers during
election time, the NDP failed to be the party of choice
amongst trade unionists.
In 1962, the NDP participated in its first federal
election.

In many ways, the 1962 election results were

neither overwhelmingly positive nor were they negative.

On

the one hand, the NDP did succeed in winning a record number
10 seats in British Columbia

and 6 seats in Ontario.

Many

NDPers attributed these gains to labour's financial
contributions and organizational expertise.
hand, the NDP won only
expected.

On the other

19 seats which was far less than

Interestingly, for the first time the party

failed to win a single seat in Saskatchewan.

For many

within the party's left wing, the 1962 election was proof
that moving away from its rural roots would do nothing to
improve the party’s electoral fortunes.

Thus, the 1962

federal election failed to resolve the internal debate
raging within the NDP over party policy and its
relationship with organized labour.
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Although the debate surrounding party-labour relations
remained unresolved, statistical evidence shows that trade
unionists did not rally behind the NDP during the 1962
federal election (Table 1.1).
TABLE 1.1
Trade Union Voting, Federal Election, 1962.
=

=

I

Union Families

=

1 Conservative

= Liberal

I NDP

=

Non-Union

E Families

E

=

E

26%

3

8

=

=

22

40%

3

8

=

8

S o u r c e : Gad Horowitz ,= Canadian. Labour in Poli tics, 1968,p41.
®ie data indicates th^t the NDP received fevSer union votes
•Qian either the ConseiS/atives or the Liberals.

Certainly,

■Qien, while the leadership of the CLC was prepared to
^ldorse the NDP, rank a n d file union members were not as
eager to follow their ^Leaders advice.
E

=

Unfortunately for the NDP, the inability of labour

Readers to influence t3ie voting behaviour of their members
prevented the party faarn making substantial |electoral gains
Si 1962.

Additionally, many of the NDP's traditional

Supporters did not agree with the party’s sKift toward the

“

Z

3
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political centre-

Now perceived by many as labour's party,

the NDP lost further support from those people who had a
negative image of the labour movement-

Ultimately, these

issues would continue to dominate the nature and scope of
NDP-labour relations throughout the following decades.
Part 3.
NDP-Labour Relations:

1963-1988

From 1963 to 1988, the NDP found itself incapable of
moving beyond the status of a minor party for several
reasons.

The change from CCF to NDP did not lead to large-

scale union affiliation to the party.

More seriously,

however, the NDP failed to obtain significant support from
rank and file trade unionists during election time.

As

stated earlier, many of the party's critics believed that
the lack of electoral success was attributed to the party's
shift towards the political centre.

By

the late 1960s, a

significant number of NDP dissenters argued that the party
should return to its socialist roots.

Within the labour

movement significant changes were also becoming evident.
Labour found itself unprepared to deal with a series of
economic crises which arose during the 1970s.

As a result,

conflict between international and national unions
eventually changed the overall composition and policy
direction of the CLC.
During the 1960s support for the NDP remained
relatively unchanged.

As discussed, the party had won 19
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seats in 1962 and although it made marginal gains in terms
of popular vote, by the 1968 election it won only 22 seats.
For many NDPers, who had been opposed to the party's more
moderate platform, electoral mediocrity
experiment had failed.

was proof that the

Eventually known as the Waffle

movement, this group of disaffected party members proposed
that the NDP return to its socialist roots.

They argued

that Canada's sovereignty was threatened by foreign
investment and control.

Additionally, Wafflers favoured

more social ownership and democratic control over all
institutions within society.

They also insisted that the

party's bureaucrats be more open to criticism from its
members as well.

By 1969 this group drafted the Waffle

Manifesto, which was presented and later defeated at the
party's national convention in Winnipeg.
It is not surprising that the Waffle movement
ultimately failed.

After all, the majority of NDP members

and convention delegates had consistently supported the
party's shift to the political centre.

By contrast, the

Waffle Manifesto mirrored the Regina Manifesto in many ways.
The first paragraph of the Waffle Manifesto stated the
following:

"Our aim as democratic socialists is to build an

independent socialist Canada."(52)

With respect to labour,

the Waffle Manifesto argued that "It is now time to go
beyond the welfare state."(53)

The Manifesto's defeat in

1969 did not weaken the Waffle movement and the movement's
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leader, Jim Laxer, would eventually challenge David Lewis
for the party's leadership during its 1971 convention.
The party's selection of David Lewis as their leader
was significant in determining future relations between the
NDP and organized labour.

David Lewis had been actively

seeking labour's support for the party since the late 1930s.
He had also been instrumental during negotiations with CLC
leaders to create the NDP in 1961-

Now that Lewis was

running for leadership of the NDP, it was clear which
candidate labour was prepared to support.

In fact, the

overwhelming majority of labour delegates did support David
Lewis over Jim Laxer in a what was a very close leadership
race.

If Laxer had won the leadership contest, the NDP

would have certainly moved to the left and that would have
had a negative impact on the party's relationship with the
labour establishment.

However, it is unclear, and almost

impossible to assess, whether or not the NDP would have
gained support from rank and file trade unionists had Laxer
won the leadership of the NDP.
Within a year of becoming leader of the NDP, David
Lewis led his party into an election.
a party high of 31 seats.

In 1972, the NDP won

However, despite the increase in

seats, the NDP's percentage of the popular vote of 17.7
percent was not much higher than the party's 1968 showing
when it received 17 percent support from the electorate.(54)
In fact, the highest level of popular support received by
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the NDP was in 1988 when the party received 20.4 percent of
the popular vote.

Thus, on a nation-wide basis, support for

the NDP during the 1970s-l9S0s remained relatively
unchanged.

Why did the party fail to make significant

electoral gains?

It appears that while union leaders

supported the party, rank and file trade unionists continued
to vote Liberal or Conservative.

Moreover, since the NDP

appeared stuck as a minor third party, many trade unionists
often voted Liberal as a way of preventing the Conservatives
from forming the government.

During the 1974 federal

election, for example, most trade unionists voted Liberal
because the Conservatives had promised to introduce wage
controls during the campaign.
Table 1.2
PARTY VOTE BY UNION STATUS, 1979 & 1984

Non -Unionists
(%)

1979
Liberal
Conservative
New Democrat
N

Members of
Non-affiliated
Unions (%)

Members of
Affiliated
Unions (%)

N

42.2
43.1
11.5
(1221)

41.8
31.9
20.0
(812)

40.4
28.6
29.9
(110)

(899)
(817)
(336)

25.9
60.2
13.1
(1761)

24.9
53.5
20.3
(1122)

7.5
53.7
38.8
(67)

(742)
(1697)
(485)

1984
Liberal
Conservative
New Democrat
N
Source:

Keith Archer, Political Choices and Electoral
Consequences, 1990, pp. 62-63.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37

Table 1.2 shows that among non-affiliated union members, the
NDP

finished third, behind both the conservatives and the

Liberals during the 1979 and 1984 election campaigns.
Interestingly in 1979

members of affiliated unions

overwhelmingly supported the Liberals and only marginally
favoured the NDP over the Conservatives.

During the 1984

federal election, the results indicate that members of
affiliated unions supported the Conservatives far more than
they did for the NDP.

Clearly, then, the majority of trade

unionists were not voting for the NDP.

As well, even those

members from affiliated union locals, to a lesser degree,
supported either the Conservatives or the Liberals over the
NDP.

Table 1.3
Unions Affiliated with the NDP and
Membership of Affiliated Unions
as a Percentage of
Total Union Membership, Selected Years

Year

Number of
Affiliated
Locals

1961
1962
1963
1964
1969
1974
1979
1984

278
612
689
683
764
754
745
730

Members of
Affiliated
Locals(1000s)
71
186
218
216
256
283
295
267

Total
Union
Membership
('000s)
1423
1449
1493
1589
2075
2732
3397
3651

Union
Members
Affiliated
(%)
5.0
12.9
14.6
13.6
12.3
10.4
8.7
7.3

Source: NDP files, "Organizations affiliated with the NDP,"
selected years; Canada, Labour Canada, Directory of Labour
Organizations in Canada, 1984.
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The transition from CCF to NDP also failed to lead to
large-scale union affiliation with the party.

Table 1.3

indicates that shortly after the NDP was founded the number
of union locals choosing to affiliate with the party more
than doubled.

However, by 1963, and only two years after

the creation of the NDP, the affiliation process had peaked.
Table 1.3 shows that the number of union members belonging
to affiliated unions, as a percentage of Canada's total
union membership, steadily declined from a high of 14.6
percent in 1963 to a low of 7.3 percent by 1984.

This

decline is attributed to the number of new labour
organizations, including public-sector unions, which grew
rapidly during this period but were not interested in
affiliating with the party.

Therefore, formal links between

the NDP and labour have never comprised a large percentage
of Canada's total union membership.
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Table 1.4
Federal New Democratic Party Revenues, 1980-81, 1984-85
1980

1981

1984

338,271

353,300

417,480

1,364,557

161,886

1,741,575

UNION TOTAL
869,401

1,702,828

515,186

2,159,055

FEDERAL TOTAL
6,284,316

4,920,447

3,855,812

7,356,903

Source
1985
Union
Affiliation
Dues
566,833
Other Union
302,568

$

Source:
Canada, Elections Canada, Registered Party Fiscal
Period Returns, selected years.
The $3ata in table 1.4 divides labour's financial
contributions to the NDP into two categories and the years
selected illustrate the difference between union totals in
election years (1980,1984) and non-election years
(1981,1985).

Table 1.4 shows that union affiliation dues

were small, yet steady, as a percentage of total federal
party revenues.

However, other union contributions

fluctuated tremendously between election and non-election
years.

This is a significant point because it illustrates

the importance of having labour as an ally during election
time.

Labour's financial contributions greatly enhanced its

ability to influence the policy direction taken by the
party.

The party bureaucrats recognized that an NDP

election platform had to conform with the interests of
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labour if it expected to receive much needed financial
contributions.

Moreover, this need for labour's financial

support was only further exacerbated as election campaign
costs escalated quickly during this period.

The Transformation of Labour in Canada
While the NDP struggled to improve its electoral
fortunes, the labour movement in Canada experienced a number
of profound changes.

Rising inflation and unemployment

rates combined with declining economic growth made labour
far more militant during the 1970s than it had been during
the economically prosperous 1960s.

A rift within the

international unions soon emerged when American union
leaders eagerly supported protectionist government measures
as a way to save jobs, even if it was at the expense of
their Canadian members.(55)

Unhappy with this stance, many

of the Canadian affiliates broke their ties with these
internationals to create the Council of Canadian Unions.
The majority, however, demanded, and eventually received,
greater autonomy from the internationals while remaining
within the CLC.
In addition to the emerging differences between
national and international unions was the growth of publicsector unions. Public-sector union growth can be attributed
to the expansion in the size of government at all three
levels.

The many social programs and services introduced
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during the 1960s and 1970s required thousands of new
government employees to implement and administer.
Representing the majority of these workers was the Canadian
Union of Public Employees (CUPE).

CUPE's growth had a

significant impact on the future course of action taken by
the CLC.

Once dominated by private sector workers, the CLC

was increasingly becoming influenced by public-sector
workers.

During the 1974 CLC convention it was CUPE which

organized a reform group to question the role of the
international unions.

By 1975 CUPE became the largest union

in Canada. Paralleling the growth of the public-sector
unions was the decline in the number of international unions
in Canada.

Their share of organized workers fell from 71

percent in 1965 to 51 percent in 1975.(56)
The tremendous rate of growth that was occurring
amongst

nationals led to tension between these unions and

the internationals within the CLC.

The internationals were

vehemently opposed to the notions of Canadian nationalism
and autonomy.

Although the internationals were in a state

of numerical decline, they still held the balance of power
within the CLC.

Consequently, the NDP was forced to back

down from pursuing a more nationalistic agenda, which would
have attracted the rank and file fearful that their jobs
were threatened
protectionism.

because of the growing threat of American
Robert Laxer points out that in 1975, the

president of the CLC, Joe Morris, "...made it clear that
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continued financial and other backing of the CLC for the NDP
would depend in the future on a continued rejection of
nationalism as the answer to that threat of multinational
corporations in Canada."(57)

Not until the national unions

were able to comprise a strong majority within the CLC did
the organization alter its stance on this issue.
The CLC, however, did step up its political activity.
When the Liberals imposed compulsory wage and price controls
in 1975, the CLC successfully organized a "Day of Protest"
the following y ear.(58)

However, labour’s opposition,

although impressive, did not convince the Liberals to
reverse their decision.

It soon became clear to many union

leaders that only with closer ties to the NDP could labour's
political objectives be realized.

This growing sentiment

was gradually reinforced during the late seventies and early
eighties as national unions continued to grow.

By 1986, 61

percent of organized workers were in national unions and
only 39 percent in international unions.(59)
Why, then, did the NDP fail to attract support from
rank and file trade unionists during this period?

The

answer is that NDP-labour relations were shaped by way of
discussions between prominent party members and union
leaders.

Labour's ties with the NDP were seldom determined

by the workers themselves.

Not surprisingly, union leaders

invariably failed to influence the voting behaviour of their
members.

Additionally, the structure of the labour movement
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in Canada inhibited its ability to act as a unified body.
Although the majority of labour unions were part of the CLC,
that organization did not have the authority to dictate to
its members how to act.

For the NDP that meant that

receiving an endorsement from the CLC did not necessarily
mean that support from all of the Congress's members would
follow.

To further complicate matters,

individual unions

themselves were often divided along provincial or regional
lines when deciding whether or not to support the NDP.
Ultimately, labour’s sizeable financial contributions helped
the NDP, but failure to obtain support from the rank and
file prevented the party from seriously challenging the
Liberals and Conservatives during this period.

Conclusion
This chapter has presented an historical review of the
key events and issues that have shaped the N D P ’s
relationship with organized labour.

Moreover, this chapter

has clearly shown that this relationship has been tenuous at
best.

The CCF-NDP has never been a labour party.

The

rounding of the CCF was made possible only with the
cooperation of various farmer, labour and socialist groups.
Thus, labour was merely one component of a much larger
coalition of interests united by their common belief that
political change was necessary to reverse the economic
misery caused by the Depression.
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During the 193 0s labour's support for the CCF was
almost non-existent.

The labour movement in Canada,

traditionally weak and fragmented, was limited further by
the Depression.

With few financial resources, a small

membership, and with the majority of its leaders unwilling
to support direct political action, labour’s role and
influence within the CCF remained marginal.
The advent of the Second World War, however,
permanently changed the nature of CCF-labour relations.
Industrial expansion and full employment was realized during
the war years because Canada had to supply itself and its
allies with the necessary supplies to defeat the Axis
powers.

Rapid industrial expansion also led to a sizeable

increase in the number of industrial unions in Canada.
These industrial unions, many of which were organized by the
“ •»—. Communists, were increasingly militant and politically
active.

In 1940, they formed the CCL and in less than three

years the new organization endorsed the CCF.

With

significant labour backing and a growing number of
supporters and members, the CCF appeared on the verge of
assuming power in the upcoming 1945 election.

The governing

Liberals, however, spoiled any plans that the CCF may have
had.

The Liberals responded to the CCF threat by making key

concessions to labour.

They also forged an alliance with

the Communists in a number of key industrial constituencies
in order to defeat the CCF.
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The CCF's disappointing showing during the 1945
election forced the party to re-examine its political
strategy.

The C C F ’s left-wing argued that the more moderate

position expressed in the pages of the 1944 manifesto was to
blame.

The party’s leaders, however, were committed to

steering the CCF further towards the political centre.

The

second part of this chapter has illustrated why the CCF
decided to draft and approve the more moderate Winnipeg
Declaration of Principles to supersede the party's Regina
Manifesto.

The CCF hoped that a more moderate political

platform would attract the growing numbers of middle class
Canadians and trade unionists.

Although the CC F ’s electoral

fortunes continued to decline, trade union leaders were
increasingly supportive of the party.

The merger between

the TLC and the CCL to form the CLC provided the CCF with
much needed financial support.

During the following years

the CCF, with cooperation from the CLC, created the NDP.
Despite the fanfare associated with the announcement of the
new party, the NDP failed to make the electoral gains it had
hoped for during its first election campaign in 1962.

Many

of the party's members grew increasingly critical of its
closer ties with the labour movement.

They also argued that

the NDP's acceptance of the welfare state, instead of
socialism, contributed to the party's electoral woes.
The third, and final, section of this chapter examined
the NDP's electoral performance from the 1960s to the 1980s
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and the party’s relationship with organized labour.
N D P ’s

The

relationship with labour became increasingly

controversial.

By the late 1960s the Waffle faction within

the NDP urged that the party return to its socialist roots.
On the other hand, the party’s leadership appeared committed
to the principles of closer ties with labour and political
moderation.

Did the NDP ultimately benefit electorally

because of its closer ties to organized labour?

Using

selected years, table 1.2 illustrated that rank and file
trade unionists did not support the NDP over the Liberals
and Conservatives.

Moreover, the data from table 1.3 showed

that the number of Canadians belonging to affiliated unions
were always small when compared to the size of the country's
total union membership.

In terms of financial

contributions, table 1.4 showed that union dues from
affiliation were minor, yet steady, whereas other union
contributions tended to be sizeable although only during
election years.
Part three of this chapter examined the changes that
occurred within the labour movement between 1963 to 1988.
Additionally, by the mid-1970s the CLC, now dominated by
these national unions, supported the NDP more
enthusiastically than ever before.

As mentioned, however,

this enthusiasm failed to spill over and influence the
voting preferences of the rank and file.
Clearly, then, the analysis has demonstrated that there
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are many factors which have influenced the nature and scope
of

NDP-labour relations.

At times, labour has perceived

its relationship with the NDP as advantageous.

Still, there

have been other times when labour has distanced itself from
the party.

The NDP, however, has been more consistent with

its position.

The party has always welcomed labour's

support while at the same time it has guarded against
possible trade union domination.

Finally, it is important

to note that NDP-labour relations have been determined
mostly by the various leaders of these two organizations.
Consequently, even when NDP-labour relations were good, the
voting behaviour of rank and file trade unionists did not
alter greatly.

By contrast, many of the N D P ’s traditional

supporters grew disillusioned because of the party's
abandonment of the socialist cause.

Interestingly, the

following chapters will show that NDP-labour relations have
endured many of these same qualities during the 1990s.

This

chapter, therefore, has provided the foundation necessary
for the remainder of this study.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
CHAPTER

TWO

This chapter provides a review of the literature
regarding NDP-labour relations from 1938 to 1995.

Included

in this chapter are various newspaper articles, books, NDP
documents including renewal conference literature, and
various labour discussion papers.

As discussed in chapter

one, NDP-labour relations have always been dynamic and
complicated.

At times, for instance, labour has been

divided over its role in politics.

During the 1930s and

1940s industrial unions were more politically active than
their craft union counterparts from the TLC.

By the 1960s

and 1970s, the growth of the national union led by the
public sector unions, sparked the re-emergence of a more
militant and politically active labour movement.
The growth of the public sector unions has had a
profound impact on labour-NDP relations in the 1990s.

This

is because provincial NDP governments have been faced with
either downsizing the public service, to the dismay of their
traditional union supporters, or maintaining the status quo,
thus angering the majority of the electorate.

The

literature clearly points to the fact that when in
government, the dynamics which influence party-labour
relations change dramatically.

As well, literature probing

into the NDP's organizational structure, its presence and
influence in Quebec, and its ideological orientation are
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also discussed.
In addition, this chapter exposes the multitude of
factors which have compelled the NDP and organized labour to
re-examine their role with one another.

More specifically,

the serious decline of the federal NDP during the 1993
election has led many within the labour movement and the NDP
to doubt the value of a continued relationship.

Not all

segments of the labour movement, however, are critical of
the NDP.

For example, the literature review

will show that

most private-sector unions continue to remain loyal to the
NDP.

Thus, there are divisions within the labour movement

as to whether it is politically advantageous to have ties
with the NDP.

Similarly, the NDP has openly questioned what

labour's role within the party, if any, should be.

Lastly,

and most importantly, it can be clearly drawn from the ‘
review of the literature that NDP-labour tensions stem from
a number of organizational deficiencies.

These

organizational deficiencies not only adversely effect NDPlabour relations, they also impair the federal party's
ability to devise a coherent political strategy.
The Political Party:

A Theoretical Perspective

A theoretical explanation of the role political parties
play in society, as well as their organizational structure,
is an extremely valuable prerequisite for the understanding
of the pertinent factors which have shaped NDP-labour
relations in the 1990s.

After all, political parties are in
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fact organizations which have their own internal authority
structures and decision-making capacities.
The political party must contend with a number of
organizational dilemmas.

It must maintain organizational

continuity and hierarchical stability, while at the same
time, it must offer incentives to various sub-groups and
individuals in order to receive support.(1)

Angelo

Panebianco contends that a political party must offer both
collective and selective incentives in order to avoid intra
party conflict.(2)

Under the collective incentives theory

one participates because he/she shares the same political or
social goals as the party's other participants.

Selective

incentives, on the other hand, describe the benefits
received by only some members for their participation, such
as promotion within the party's hierarchy.
The political party must counterbalance the
distribution of selective incentives with collective
incentives because one works against the other.(3)

Party

elites, for instance, often participate with the expectation
of personal reward.

Their dedication to the organization

therefore is not for the exclusive purpose of advancing the
organization's principles.

Personal ambition, however, must

not disrupt the organization's ideology or "cause" because
it conceals the distribution of selective incentives from
those who do not benefit.(4)

This is an important point

because it explains, in part, why during periods of
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ideological change, intra-party conflict within the NDP has
erupted.

Most notably, the transition from CCF to NDP

angered many party members, as well as the party's socialist
wing, because it was seen as an attempt by the party to
strengthen its ties with labour at their expense.

These

internal divisions in fact plagued the NDP until the
expulsion of the Wafflers in the early 1970s.

On the other

hand, it could also be argued that since there were no
significant structural differences between the CCF and its
successor the NDP, the NDP successfully distributed a
collective incentive to labour while concealing the
distribution of selective incentives to non-labour members.
Indeed, labour's representation whether at party conventions
or on Federal Council did not change after the party’s
transition from the CCF to the NDP.
Panebianco's organizational analysis also sheds light
on why NDP-labour relations appear to deteriorate when the
party forms the government.

This is because when in

government, the importance of adhering to the party’s
ideology and its principles are not considered as important
as the managerial responsibilities associated with
governing.

As a result, many of those participants once

united by a common cause become alienated when it becomes
clear that the party is incapable of implementing all of its
promises.

Thus, the collective incentive for many members

is lost and consequently a party loses rank and file
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support.
Similarly, Samuel Eldersveld, whose research has
focused on party structure, argues:

"The party is a

mutually exploitative relationship - it is joined by those
who would use it; it mobilizes for the sake of power those
who would join it."(5)

Clearly, the relationships between

the party and its various supporters is seen in a similar
fashion not only between Eldersveld and Panebianco, but with
Goldman's transaction analysis, as well.

All three believe

that the party must offer some form of incentive to
attractive participants, and that the participants must
likewise offer something of value to the party in return.
Therefore, when examining NDP-labour relations, it is
important to uncover what the gains and losses have been for
~*L~TDdth sides under the rules which have defined the parameters
of their relationship.

Party Structure
The NDP is unique in its structural composition when
compared to Canada's traditional parties.

Unlike the

Conservatives and the Liberals, the NDP is an integrated
party which means that there is no clear separation (with
the exception of the NDP's Quebec wing) between its
provincial and federal wings.

Consequently, any person who

chooses to join the NDP automatically becomes a member of
both the federal party and the provincial party.

The
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serious decline of the federal NDP has led many within the
party to re-examine its organizational structure.

For

example, should the party be more centralized or
decentralized?

Is the NDP's financial structure placing the

federal party at a disadvantage in relation to its
provincial wings?

Lastly,should there be structural changes

in order to improve how the NDP formulates its policies?
Alan Sharp, maintains that a major problem with the NDP
is that the Federal Party does not know who its members are.
Under the party's current constitution the provincial wings
have control of the membership lists.

Sharp contends that

the Federal Party must be given these membership lists so
that it can communicate with its members more directly.

In

addition to Sharp's article, Brian Harling's Why Separate
Federal and Provincial Memberships Won't Work and Marion

Dewar's Restructuring of the New Democratic Party of Canada,
argue for a stronger federal wing as well.
is centred around money.

The main issue

Currently, the Federal Party

receives 15 per cent of all revenues raised by the
provincial wing as its main source of m oney.(6)

As well,

the NDP's provincial wings are responsible for giving 60
percent of the monies collected from its affiliated trade
unions to the federal NDP . (7)

Since the Federal Party

relies on the provincial wing for its revenues derived from
provincial membership lists, it is clear why the federal
party wants access to them.

As Sharp points out: "Some
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means must be found for the Federal Party to have its own
membership lists, and to be free to organize them,
communicate with them and ask them directly for money.” (8)
By contrast, many provincial leaders, described by
Whitehorn as feudal barons,(9) are opposed to the prospect
of having to compete with the Federal Party for funds.
According to Ian McLeod, the provinces often fall behind in
their payments to the Federal Party.(10)

The Federal Party,

unfortunately, does not have the authority to force the
provincial sections to pay.

In fact, during the mid-1980s

many provinces had fallen so far behind in their payments
that the Federal Party worked out an agreement which saw it
receive $1.00 for every $2.00 owed.(11)

For obvious reasons

this dependence on the party's provincial wings has made it
difficult for the Federal Party to plan its own budget both
during election and non-elections years.

Moreover, the

financial committee of the Federal Party is made up of the
NDP's provincial and territorial treasurers.(12)

In other

words, those responsible for approving Federal Party
expenditures are the same people who have often fallen
behind in their payments to the Federal Party.
The legality of the NDP's rules outlining party finance
is also open to question.
Expenses Act

The passage of the Elections

in 1974 was intended to permit federal

political parties to issue tax exemption receipts for
political donations.

However,

because the NDP's provincial
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wings are responsible for handling membership funds, in
actual fact, the federal exemption has helped the NDP's
provincial wings.

When considering that the provinces have

fallen behind in their payments to the Federal Party, while
at the same time benefitting from a federal tax exemption,
it is obvious why some New Democrats are dissatisfied with
the current financial arrangement.
Another contentious issue surrounding the NDP's
organizational structure is that the provincial presence
within the Federal Party is increased further during
election campaigns.

McLeod points out that "The provincial

offices house the field organizers and co-ordinate much of
the federal election advertising and federal worker
training."(13)

As well, the Strategy and Election Planning

Committee (SEPC), which becomes the key body of the party
during federal elections, includes many imports from its
provincial wings.
In addition to being comprised of many provincial party
staffers, the SEPC was expanded to 50 members by the 1993
federal election.

The expansion of the SEPC was in response

to labour's criticisms that it did not have an adequate
voice within the decision-making process during the 1988
campaign.(14)

Moreover, Whitehorn points out that because

of its large size,
steering committees.

the SEPC had a number of smaller
The roost important of these committees

in 1993 was the 14 person election platform committee.
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committee was responsible for creating a political platform
from the hundreds of resolutions presented at NDP
conventions.(15)

Although the expansion of the SEPC was

designed to give party members a greater voice in the
decision-making process,

its large si 2 e diminished the

likelihood of achieving the consensus necessary for
developing a coherent electoral platform.
The process by which resolutions are passed within the
NDP also contributes to the party's inability to develop an
articulate a coherent political message.

Historically,

resolutions presented at party conventions have come from
local NDP ridings.

As a result, hundreds of various

resolutions reach the convention floor.

However, few of

these resolutions are actually discussed because a
Resolutions Committee is responsible for deciding which
resolutions will actually be debated.(16)

According to

Sharp, this is a "morale sapping process" because it
prevents the discussion of controversial topics.(17)
short, then, policy

In

development within the NDP, although

encouraged, is significantly controlled by the party’s
elite.

Moreover, the introduction of hundreds of

resolutions at party conventions complicates and frustrates
the party’s ability to formulate a clear and concise
political platform.
The NDP's integrated structure has also frustrated the
Federal Party's electoral fortunes because it is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61

incompatible with the realities of Canadian federalism.

The

premise behind the NDP's integrated model is that its
members are united by their social democratic beliefs.

In

reality, however, the views of social democrats in rural
Saskatchewan, for instance, are different from those in
Ontario.

This reality has further complicated the Federal

Party's ability to develop policies because the differences
between its provincial wings translate into a mishmash of
policy proposals.

As Steve Lee points out:

The Integrated

Party is not realistic given the profoundly regional,
decentralized and federal nature of Canada.,r(18)

As well,

Nelson Riis, one of the few federal NDP MPs to retain his
seat after the 1993 election, describes the federal NDP as
"a collection of provincial organizations whose first
thought is not the federal party and often not Canada.^(19)
Clearly, the value of the NDP's integrated structure is
questionable, and now seriously challenged following the
Federal Party's dismal electoral showing in 1993.
Although the party established the Council of Fer‘lural
Ridings (CFR) in 1990 to encourage greater focus on federal
issues, this new body has few powers.

Donna Shire contends

that the CFR's did not have direct access to the local
ridings, nor did they have a notable presence within the
SEPC.(20)

Thus, the presence of the CFR's were more

symbolic than practical.

Moreover, the establishment of the

CFR's has, according to Whitehorn, swelled the number of
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Federal Council members from 150 to an unmanageable 200.(21)
Clearly, then, while the CFR's have produced few tangible
benefits for the Federal Party, their presence has only
added another layer to an already overweight and complicated
bureaucratic structure.
The integrated structure of the NDP has also meant that
the Federal Party’s popularity has often been directly
related to the popularity of NDP provincial governments.

In

1993, the unpopularity of the Ontario NDP government, for
instance, had a profound impact on the electoral fortunes of
the Federal Party. Many of the Federal Party's traditional
labour supporters either reduced or diverted their
contributions originally allocated to the Federal Party
because of the social contract legislation passed by the NDP
in Ontario.(22)

Therefore, in addition to examining NDP-

labour relations at the federal level, it is also necessary
to examine the dynamics of this relationship at the
provincial level, as well.

Party Leadership
Literature which examined the role, and the impact, of
the NDP's last two leaders, Ed Broadbent and Audrey
McLaughlin, was also reviewed.
Broadbent:

In Judy Steed's Ed

The Pursuit of Power, there is a very

sympathetic evaluation of Broadbent's leadership of the NDP.
Steed points out that the party had its best ever showing
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under Broadbent's reign, citing examples that the NDP had
reached a record high support rating in the summer of 1987
(44%), and won a record number of seats and popular vote in
the 1988 election.(23)

Robert Campbell and Leslie Pal,

however, in The Real Worlds of Canadian Politics, second
edition, note that Broadbent's support for the Meech Lake
Accord angered many of the party's traditional supporters
such as Aboriginals, women's groups, and labour.(24)
Additionally, Whitehorn criticizes Broadbent for becoming
too cautious and dependent on polling as the party grew in
popularity.

He also accuses Broadbent and his advisors of

not taking a strong stance against free trade in 1988 for
the purpose of making political gains in Quebec because most
Quebecers were in favour of free trade.(25)

This position

not only failed to lead to electoral gains in Quebec for the
NDP, but it also caused a serious rift between labour
leaders, strongly opposed to the Free Trade deal, and the
party.
Audrey McLaughlin was elected to succeed Broadbent
during the NDP's 1989 leadership convention.

McLaughlin, an

outspoken opponent of the Meech Lake Accord and the only
female candidate to run for the party's leadership, defeated
Dave Barrett after a long battle on the fourth ballot.
According to McLeod, McLaughlin received the support of most
of the labour delegates at the convention, including two of
Canada's most prominent labour leaders, Bob White and
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Steelworkers director Leo Gerard.(26)

Labour’s support for

McLaughlin, however, declined steadily during the period
leading up to the 1993 election campaign.

Labour leaders

became increasingly agitated over McLaughlin’s apparent
unwillingness to criticize the Rae government’s performance
in Ontario.

McLeod points out that labour was angered by

McLaughlin's initial refusal to criticize Rae's social
contract legislation.(27)

Consequently, labour's enthusiasm

for the federal NDP diminished substantially in terms of
personnel support and financial contributions.

More

importantly, emerging out of the ashes of the federal NDP's
electoral performance was a great deal of mistrust between
the party and many unions within the Canadian labour
movement.

The NDP in Quebec: Le Neant
The NDP has never been much of a political force in
Quebec.

Electoral support for the NDP's predecessor, the

CCF, during election time averaged only 1.5 per cent from
1935 to 1958. (28)

Moreover, Whitehorn notes that in

successive elections from 1962 to 1988, the NDP managed to
obtain on average only 8.1 per cent of the total vote in
Quebec.

In fact, the NDP has only won one seat in Quebec,

that during a 1990 by-election in Chambly.

Electoral data

obtained from Frizzell, Pammett and Westell show that the
sole NDP incumbent in Quebec, Phil Edmonston, did not run
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for re-election during the 1993 federal election.
Incidently, on election night the Bloc

Quebecois candidate

received 59.7 percent of the vote in Chambly while the New
Democrat candidate received only 2.9 percent of the
vote.(29) According to McLeod, the NDP in Quebec received
less than 2 percent of the vote and eighteen of its
candidates in fact collected fewer votes than the Natural
Law Party in 1993.(30)
NDP-labour relations within the province of Quebec have
also been particularly weak.

Archer- indicates that as of

1985 only 12 union locals were affiliated to the NDP in
Quebec, accounting for only 1.6 per cent of affiliated
locals nationwide.(31)

Why have ties between the NDP and

the labour movement been largely insignificant in the
province of Quebec?

Robert Laxer explains that the labour

movement in Quebec has been distinct and increasingly
separate from labour organizations in the rest of
Canada.(32)

The powerful Confederation of National Trade

Unions (CNTU), made up of mostly public sector unions, and
the Union of Quebec Teachers (Corporation des enseignents du
Quebec or CEQ) are two of the largest labour organizations
in Quebec, and neither of these two organizations are
affiliated to the CLC.

According to Laxer, the nationalism

of Quebec labour "...was focussed mainly on the domination
of Quebec by the Canadian federal state."(33)

Not

surprisingly, then, a significant number of labour unions in
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Quebec support the sovereignty option.

In fact, a Toronto

Star article, written by Robert McKenzie on March 26, 1995
described the CNTU's president, Gerald Larose, as "one of
the most ardent supporters of the sovereigntist cause."(34)
Moreover, formal ties between labour and the NDP, and
electoral support for the party in Quebec have been almost
non-existent.

For these reasons this study will, for the

most part, exclude the province of Quebec.

Ideology and the NDP
In an article written in the Toronto Star, Steven
Langdon states, referring to the NDP,

that:

"The future

will result from the same activism and on-the-ground
struggle that built progressive political movements
throughout Canada's history."(35)

Moreover, Langdon's

argument is that the Party needs to be more active rather
than just debating political philosophy like the Liberals
and Conservatives.

This sentiment is echoed by many other

party members, including Eugene Kostyra.

Kostyra, one of

the party's regional directors, contends that the NDP has to
differentiate itself from the other parties and that "...it
must be truly a left Party...."It must understand that there
is a ruling class and a working class and it must govern on
the side of the working class."(36)

While, Kostyra's

sentiment reflects a common position within the NDP,
empirical research indicates

"—

that the party

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

67

conventions today may not have as strong a working-class
base as in the past."(37).

For example,

Whitehorn and

Archer, on the basis of NDP convention studies, indicate
that 31.6% of Party members consider themselves as lowermiddle, working or lower class.

By contrast, 68.5% of those

surveyed were described as upper, upper-middle, or middle
class (47.3% considered themselves middle class, 20.5%
classified themselves as upper-middle class, and 0.7%
considered themselves as upper-class).(38)
It appears that the changing face of NDP members has
had an impact on the Party and its policies.

This is not to

suggest that a person's class necessarily reflects how
he/she stands on a certain issue.

Rather, it does suggest

that it becomes increasingly more difficult

for the NDP to

hold on to principles that may be seen now as obsolete
because of the ever changing mix of an already
dynamic membership and electorate.
study also points to

diverse and

The Whitehorn-Archer

some important differences of opinion

among convention delegates in 1987.

For example, when

asked if the NDP should move more clearly to the left 39.9%
agreed while 37.9% disagreed.(39)

Furthermore, 63.3% of

convention delegates, in 1987, agreed that there were
significant differences between the left and the right
within the Party.(40)

Not surprisingly, the miserable

showing made by the NDP during the 1993 election has made
these differences more profound, and at the same time, more
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public.

This is because each side has chosen to blame the

other for the NDP's serious electoral decline.
While some prominent NDPers, such as Party

secretary

Fraser Green, suggest that the post-October era opens the
door to turn "crisis into opportunity,"(41)

the fact of the

matter is that there is a great deal of potential for
conflict between various groups within the Party over its
future.

Stephen Langdon, for example, is critical of the

national party executive for deciding unilaterally to cancel
the 1994 convention.

This, Langdon argues, has meant that

the executive elected in 1991 still controls the party
despite its decline.

He describes the executive membership

as the "...same questionable group, who took the party from
a 30 per cent popular rating...in 1989...to just over 7 per
cent in 1993."(42) The prospects, however,

for conflict

should not be overstated because despite the differences in
opinion on specific issues, there is a general consensus
that the Party stands for social justice and equality.
again, referring to NDP delegates,
for instance, argue

Once

Whitehorn and Archer,

that members of the NDP

were further

'left' than their Liberal and Conservative counterparts.(43)
For the purpose of this study, this information is important
to keep in mind because it demonstrates that the terms
'left' and 'right* are being used in the context of the NDP
only and not within the broader Canadian political spectrum.
Articles written by a number of NDP members

indicate
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that the building blocks for renewal do exist.
states, in an article presented at the August
conference, that:

Pat Lorje
renewal

"We can't always agree with each other,

but we share a passionate belief that we can somehow create
a perfect community for all people.
privileged minority."(44)

Not just for a

Lorje then

has difficulty in identifying

admits that the party

who the NDP should represent.

Moreover, Lorje is critical of the Party for blindly
supporting certain issues without any debate.

Examples used

by Lorje include; to be a supporter of the left

you must

oppose free trade, support all social programs and argue for
the maintenance of universality for these programs, and you
must support the expansion of the social safety net.
concludes her article by appealing to the Party

Lorje

for "no

labels" and to avoid special interest thinking when
discussing strategies and solutions.
Howard Pawley suggests

that democratic socialism has

been put on the defensive by the neo-conservatives even
though issues such as poverty and
dominant

in the 1990s.

unemployment have become

Pawley argues

that the Party

"...appeared ambiguous in [its] articulation of an
alternative agenda..."(45)

and that "...the collapse of

communism was interpreted not as an indictment of
totalitarianism but rather that of socialism."(46)

Clearly,

then, Pawley's article suggests that the Party’s failure is
both a product of political strategy and of ideology
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post-Cold War era.

Moreover, he proposes that the NDP offer

Canadians an alternative vision, for example the extension
of the Goods and Services Tax to financial services.(47)
Pawley concludes by advocating that the NDP become more of a
mass party.
Duncan Cameron, in his editorial in the Canadian Forum,
believes that the NDP has a choice between two political
strategies:
It can follow its provincial government
wings and adopt a centre-left stance, in
the belief that no one can outflank the
NDP on the left; or it can plant its flag
clearly on the left, and work within the
universe of those who are the natural
constituencies of the NDP.(48)
Cameron sees the latter strategy as more appropriate because
it is seen as the best way to build community support.

He

points out that building community support should start with
strengthening the party's relationship with the labour
movement.

A number of questions stem from Cameron's

argument.

Will the NDP have to change its organizational

structure to accommodate various local interests, including
the labour movement, necessary for building community
support?

Or, will the NDP formulate a political platform

that aggressively represents the needs of various community
groups?
James Laxer

concentrates his criticism towards

the

neo-conservatives for attempting to manipulate people into
thinking that Government is the problem.

Instead, Laxer
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contends that governments have a positive role to play in
the economy, such as creating jobs,

rather than supporting

the costs of unemployment and underemployment.

It is

Laxer's opinion that neo-conservative policies such as free
trade, and the encouragement of globalization, have led to
less government revenues and more expenditures to people who
need assistance.

Laxer uses data from Statistics Canada to

illustrate the sorry state of working people in Canada.
example in 1992, only

For

"... 31% of all workers had full

time, year round jobs, which paid more than $30,000 a
year.(49)

And, " —

42% of workers were employed part time,

full time or on a temporary basis, or were unemployed for
part of the year.'1(50)

The statistical data used by Laxer

is designed to illustrate the disastrous results of neo
conservative policies and to reinforce his notion that if
governments create jobs, then people would become
contributors to the economy, as consumers and tax payers,
instead of looking to the state for financial aid.
Therefore, it is fair to assume that Laxer sees government
involvement in job creation as a way of cutting government
deficits, instead of cutting jobs, expenditures, and
government downsizing that has been occurring in the 1990s.
Persuading the general public that government
involvement is good, however, has become increasingly
difficult in the 1990s.

For example,

Alan W h i t e h o m

suggests that the neo-conservatism has led to increased
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taxation on the middle class and the free trade
agreement.(51)

He also points out that the constitutional

quagmire engineered by Canada's politicians has made
Canadians increasingly distrustful of government.
Judy Rebick

considers the participation of interest

groups and the population in general as fundamental for the
renewal of the NDP.
Reform Party

Rebick points to the. successes of the

as an example of the political benefits from

encouraging greater public participation in politics.
failing to do this, Rebick argues,
NDP

has shifted to that of

Consequently, this
support.
issue when

By

the perception of the

a traditional party.

has led to an erosion of the Party's

Pawley, too,

shares Rebick's opinion on this

he suggests that the Party's support for the

Charlottetown Accord, despite public opinion on the issue,
created an impression that the NDP was part of the elite.
Rebick concludes by stating that "Rather than distancing
itself from the labour movement, the Party should deepen its
relationship with labour at the grass roots level..."(52)
The relevance of

Labour

cannot be ignored

and will now be

looked at in more detail.
The NDP's Relationship With Labour
The NDP's relationship with labour has been a central
issue within the party both in the past and now at present.
As mentioned, there are those such as Kostyra, Rebick, and
Langdon,
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among others, who support stronger ties with labour.

By

contrast, there have been others who consider the Party's
ties with Labour as detrimental.

To examine this issue more

closely the material reviewed uncovered a number of
important facts which can help shed light on this subject.
Keith Archer, indicates that the change from the CCF to NDP
has never brought widespread support from the labour
movement.
NDP has

Archer contends that the Party structure of the
meant that affiliated unions generally comprise

approximately 20% of convention delegates.(53)

Furthermore,

despite a public image as being the party closely aligned to
labour, the NDP has traditionally had few unions affiliated
to it.

In fact, only 2.8% of the total Labour workforce is

affiliated to the N DP.(54)
questions can be asked.

From Archer's evidence two

First, does the lack of Labour's

support mean that the Party should make an effort to forge
closer ties?

Or, does the lack of Labour's support make it

more of a liability to the Party?

Answering these questions

are by no means easy because they are being asked not only
by

New Democrats but also by

the labour movement.

Before discussing the current state of relations
between the NDP and labour, it is important to see how each
side views its relationship with the other.

While some

argue that the labour movement is merely another special
interest group, others see the relationship as more equal
and intimate.

In a paper presented to the Canadian Labour
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Congress (CLC), Whitehorn argues that "...working in tandem
with the CLC, the CCF successfully transformed itself in
1961 into the NDP and social democracy acquired a new
momentum."(55)

In an Ontario Federation of Labour

(OFL)

report, Labour's relationship is described in a similar
fashion.

The OFL report describes the relationship as a

"partnership" and that the CLC "... adopted a resolution in
support of the already established national committee for a
new party, and in early 1961 they launched a campaign to
raise funds for the founding convention."(56)
Archer, however, point out
alleged that the "

Whitehorn and

that many within the NDP have

conservative orientation of labour,

combined with its prominence and stature within the party,
has effectively prevented the NDP from cultivating a
political soil capable of nourishing the seeds of
socialism.11(57)

Obviously, then, while some have viewed the

NDP-Labour relationship as a partnership between equals,
others view Labour as a hinderance to socialism because of
the alleged conservative orientation of Labour within the
Party.
Archer and Whitehorn

test whether the labour component

of the NDP is in fact noticeably more conservative than non
union members.
scales

A number of questionnaires using Likert

which were circulated during the 1987 NDP convention
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led Archer and Whitehorn to conclude the following:
a

™
a

™
a

™

The delegate entitlement policy for NDP conventions,
while giving labour a key presence, have not given them
a domineering role;
Labour delegates have been a substantial minority,
overwhelmingly from Ontario, and have been mostly
blue-collar workers or union representatives and are
mostly male;
In ideological terms, a majority of labour delegates
saw themselves as socialist or social democrat, and as
working class. Attitudes of union delegates were
similar to those of non-union delegates, indicating no
dramatic shift to the right.(58)

Thus, despite the critics, Archer and Whitehorn conclude
that the views, values, and attitudes of the Labour
representatives were similar to those of non-union Party
members.
The differences between Labour and the NDP do not
appear to be ideological, but why

then

has there been a

great deal of tension between Labour and the NDP?

According

to Whitehorn, the reasons for tension stem from the
differences in priorities between the two.

Whitehorn

elaborates on this point by posing the question:

"Is free

collective bargaining at the top of the rankings for
both?(59)

David Mackenzie argues that the labour movement

is simply a coalition and "Coalitions will officially feign
non-partisanship as they diligently scrutinize party
utterances for signs of betrayal and bad faith."(60)

Could

Mackenzie's claim explain why the labour movement has been
so vocally opposed to the NDP in Ontario after the
government's decision to introduce social contract
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legislation (Bill

48)?

Although Bill 4S was strongly

opposed by public sector unions,

is it enough to destroy a

relationship spanning over 30 years?

Mackenzie states that

the question which needs to be answered is:

"Does the

Canadian Labour movement orient its political activity
through an electorally-competitive social democratic party
or does it conceive itself as essentially a partner of
extra-parliamentary social coalitions?

Party politics or

coalition politics?"(61)
Historically, there are numerous examples where it
appeared that the labour movement acted as an interest group
rather than an integral part of the NDP.
report states:

Although the OFL

"We believed that within the New Democratic

Party, we were part of a partnership of e q u a l s . (62)
there are numerous examples where the Labour-NDP
relationship has been a partnership between adversaries.
For example, when the Liberal government imposed general
wage controls to combat inflation the labour movement was
outraged.

However, the two NDP premiers at that time

(Blakeney and Schreyer) supported the imposition of wage
controls.(63)

Alan Whitehorn

argues that despite the

unprecedented level of support earned by the NDP from the
1988 federal election, labour was extremely
how the campaign was run.

critical over

Whitehorn notes that Canadian

Auto Workers (CAW) president, Bob White, wrote a 7-page
letter which described the election as "disastrous" and that
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labour's "...financial and people support is accepted
gratefully, but its ideas and leadership are completely
ignored."(64)

Labour's anger was centred on the NDP's

refusal to focus chiefly on the

Free Trade issue.

Similarly, many labour leaders,

such as Bob White, felt

that

labour's representation within the SEPC was inadequate
during the 1988 campaign.
The real problem, however,

is that labour acts

simultaneously as both a partner of the NDP, as well
interest group.

as an

As an interest group, labour articulates

both non-political and political demands to various
political parties and governments.

As a co-founder of the

NDP, labour articulates its views in order to influence the
party's policies.

Unfortunately, this already complicated

arrangement becomes even more difficult to manage when the
NDP is in power.

This is because when in government the NDP

assumes a managerial role while labour's role as an interest
group does not change.

Not surprisingly, NDP-labour

relations have tended to sour when the NDP is the governing
party.
The NDP's organizational structure, unfortunately, does
not appropriately accommodate the fact that labour is both a
co-founder and an interest group.

This explains, in part,

why very few union locals have actually affiliated with the
NDP.

Is there a way in which the NDP could allow labour to

function more independently within the NDP?

Obviously, with
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under 3 percent of the labour movement affiliated to the
party, the wide array of views held by labour throughout
Canada are not being sufficiently heard.
The issue of voter support is also important in
understanding Labour-NDP tension.

Archer provides

statistical data indicating that members from unions
affiliated to the NDP have traditionally voted in greater
numbers for the Liberal Party than they have for the
N D P - (65)

Likewise, non-affiliated union members have

preferred the Liberal party over the NDP.

Therefore, in

terms of electoral support, labour has not been as valuable
an ally for the NDP as might be desired.

However, Archer is

quick to point out that Labour's contributions in terms of
money and personnel are significant.

Trade union

contributions are second only to that of
terms of total party revenues.(66)

individuals in

Second, 552 Locals and

75.7% of all affiliated union members reside in Ontario.(67)
Therefore, the NDP without the Labour movement in Ontario
would be severely weakened in terms of revenues and
personnel.

A weakened Ontario branch of the NDP would

severely limit the Party’s chances of remaining a national
party.
Despite tensions between the labour

movement and the

NDP, the repercussions of a split would be significant.
Mackenzie states, "The health and survival of organized
labour is closely bound up with the health of the democratic
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left as a whole, in Canada and elsewhere...the Canadian
labour movement needs the discipline of building a social
democratic party...M (68)

John Young

argues that "The NDP

grew out of the union of the western cooperative farm
movement and the central Canadian labour movement.

In spite

of the tensions between different elements within the Party,
this uneasy marriage still represents our greatest
strength."(69)

Therefore judging from the literature there

appears general agreement that while
relationship is a difficult one,

the Labour-NDP

ending this relationship

would not benefit either the Party or the labour movement.
In order to understand NDP-labour relations in greater
depth, and from the perspective of labour, a number of CAW
discussion papers were reviewed.

These discussion papers,

presented at the CAW's 4th constitutional convention in
Quebec City

(August 23-2 5, 1994), included a variety

proposals

which indicated a willingness by the CAW to

transform

itself and its relationship with the NDP.

Toronto Star article,
convention as

Tony Van Alphen

"confusing"

of

In a

described the CAW's

and ambiguous with respect to

the union's position over the N DP.(70)

In fact, however,

the CAW's position is similar to that of most NDP

members.

This is because both sides agree that it would not be
advantageous for a formal split between the NDP and labour
to occur.
The first discussion paper, titled VJhere are the
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Changes in Our Union Taking Us?, is primarily a self re
examination

of

the union.

The paper indicates the union's

dissatisfaction with the NDP:

"Precisely at a time when we

so desperately need an effective political voice to
articulate our needs and mobilize frustrations, the
disappointing truth is that the NDP has not been up to the
task-"(71)

Further, according to the paper,

the

fundamental strength of the union is that it has been built
in the workplace.

Consequently, the union has to be more

active in the workplace and

begin to

play "...the

leadership role in fighting for jobs," in what is described
as "Movement Unionism"(72)

Thus, the paper advocates a more

active CAW that represents and protects all working people
from governments

who act in the interests of the corporate

elite.
The second discussion paper, titled Labour and
Politics:

Rethinking, Redefining, Rebuilding, reviews

Labour's relationship with the NDP.

Emphasis is placed on

the significance of the social contract legislation in
Ontario as the main issue behind the union's re-examination
of the Labour—NDP relationship.

The discussion paper also

addresses a nurbor of questions:

«
a

^

What's the alternative?
Why did the Reform Party, so fundamentally opposed to
the values and needs of organize working people,
receive more votes from unionized workers than did the
NDP during the 1993 election?
Why are we (the left) rather than they (the right) on
the defensive?
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I
a

™

Why in Ontario is the government / party not fighting
against our powerful enemies?
Why hasn't labour been able to deliver the vote?
Are we just another interest group, concerned with
elections to consolidate our own gains?
Had we decided, in 1961, to work towards the long term
building of a socialist constituency - rather than
winning the next election - would we be better off
politically than we are today?

The paper is critical of the Ontario NDP for "...sounding
like other governments, making judgements based on
expediency, and putting the main focus on the deficit."(73)
Furthermore, the result of this action, in effect,

shows

the populace that the right is correct in its view that
debt, deficit, and downsizing should be the government's
priority.

The Ontario government, instead of following the

corporate agenda, should offer an alternative vision that
could move people and unite them against the corporate
elite.

After all, according to the discussion paper,

"The

right has controlled the economic and social agenda for the
last fifteen years.

It has had its chance to try out

solutions, and it has failed miserably."(74)
Several proposals of how the union could help revive
the Party

are addressed.

First, educational programs

need

to be designed so that the public can better understand the
labour movement.

Second, union activity should be increased

at the local level, in the community and community
struggles.

Third, the union should play a leadership role

in taking on the economic and political establishments.
Obviously, then, the CAW discussion papers indicate
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dissatisfaction with the NDP.

However, there does not

appear to be an explicit declaration of disassociation with
the federal party.

The CAW discussion papers also indicate

a commitment by the union to play a more active role in the
community and in politics separate from the NDP.
The lack of political

alternatives

to the NDP,

although significant, is not the only issue to be considered
when looking at NDP-labour tensions.

According to John

Young, a rift between some private sector unions and public
sector unions continues to deepen.

Therefore, labour itself

is divided with regard to its relationship with the NDP.

In

fact, many private sector unions affiliated to the NDP have
no intention to alter their relationship with the Party.
Referring to Tony Van Alphen’s article, many private sector
unions "...have indicated they will work actively for the
party (The Ontario NDP)

because of labor reforms and other

legislation that help workers."(75)
which was highly critical of the NDP,

Even the OFL report,
referred to Bill 40

(reform of the Ontario Labour Relations Act) as seme of the
most progressive labour legislation in North America.(76)
In Rethinking our Mission in Ontario:
Paper, for Union Leaders

(circulated

conference - author unknown),

A Discussion

at the August renewal

there is a scathing report of

the OFL*s decision to alter its relationship with the NDP in
Ontario.

In this paper, the OFL is criticized for

"quibbling” over unimportant issues at a time when the
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Labour movement should be acting in "The larger interests of
Ontario's working people."(77)

The OFL's affixation on

Bill 48 has weakened the labour movement's overall strength
to fight against the corporate agenda.
defined

The real issues are

in the paper as being free trade and unemployment:

"The steep decline in employment in central Canada's
private-sector manufacturing industries is paralleled by a
steep decline in the position and strength of industrial
unions."(78)
sector)

The decline of industrial unions (private

explains why

"...the noise that can be generated

over relatively-recent public spending cutbacks and job
reductions far exceeds what labour has been able to sustain
over the more catastrophic and economically-debilitating
losses in mines, paper mills, appliance plants, and clothing
manufacturers over the past decade and a half."(79)

Thus,

in addition to differences in priorities between labour and
the NDP, there is also a difference in priorities between
some private and public sector unions.
In fact, the report describes the divide

between

public and private sector unions in the movement as deep:
"The CAW-public sector alignment is a formidable, commanding
presence, and increasingly its political interests and
policy views differ sharply with the rest of the large
goods-and-service unions—

"(80)

The CAW-public sector

alignment is accused of being uninterested in thinking about
new strategies for creating public wealth and increasing

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

84

industrial activity.

Rather, according to the report,

"those organizations

(public sector unions) are more

interested in —

defend-the-status quo-at-all-costs approach

to their s e c t o r . (81)

Instead,

the CAW-public sector

alliance should consider strengthening its alliance with the
NDP rather than trying to break Labour’s formal linkage with
the party:

"Political renewal is only possible, re

energizing social democracy is only possible, if labour
takes a good hard look at itself."(82)
Leo Gerard, International Secretary - Treasurer - cf
the United Steelworkers of America argues that labour's
relationship with the NDP should continue.

He contends that

to respond effectively to the right wing, labour must,
instead of criticizing the NDP, maintain its commitment to
the Party and develop further electoral strategies.(83).
Gerard is critical of others who have withdrawn their
support of provincial NDP governments.

His message,

therefore, is one of unity in order to effectively counter
the powerful neo-conservative forces.
Eugene Kostyra, explains that when the NDP was formed
there were very few union members in public sector unions
that were in the CLC.(84)

The various provincial components

of what is now the National Union of

Public and General

Workers were not part of the CLC at that time.

As a result,

"Today a large majority of union members belong to those
public sector unions which do net have many local unions

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

85

affiliated to the NDP."(85)

Farther, when the NDP is

elected to govern, the NDP becomes the employer of these
non- affiliated

public sector unions and subsequently the

potential for conflict (ie. Bill 48) increases dramatically
when the government is faced with difficult fiscal
constraints.

Kostyra believes

between public sector unions

that the relationship
and the NDP could

strengthened by including more union members in
However, given the current relationship,

be
the Party.

it seems highly

unlikely that public sector unions and their members would
enthusiastically join the NDP.
itself,

First, the Labour movement

which appears fragmented between the CAW and public

sector unions

versus private sector unions, must agree

amongst themselves on a united strategy

before there can be

any strengthening of ties between the Party and Labour.
Second, if the divisions between some private and public
sector unions intensify, how will the Party bridge the gap
between the two or will it, in fact, have to choose sides
between two substantively different ideological views?(86)
Alan Whitehorn

a s k s , "Is a new party system emerging?

If so, what should the role of labour be in the newly
emerging party system?"(87)

Whitehorn looks at a number of

issues which must be examined before making a decision over
whether greater labour participation is plausible or
desirable.

Like Kostyra, Whitehorn is inclined to believe

that greater union involvement within the Party is
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necessary.

Greater involvement in terms of

at NDP conventions,

union personnel

in constituency ridings, and on the

SEPC must be considered.

As Whitehorn points out:

"It is a

curious fact in a party co-founded by the labour movement
that no labour leader has run for the leadership of the
NDP."(88)

Conclusion of Literature Review
The literature which was reviewed uncovered a number of
issues relevant to the NDP-labour relationship.
disappointing

The

electoral result in 1993 has forced New

Democrats and labour to recognize past mistakes, while
looking to possible solutions for rebuilding the party in
the future.

The literature review clearly demonstrated that

many segments within the labour movement have become
increasingly dissatisfied with their role and influence
within the NDP.

A variety of perspectives have been

presented from party members, academics, and labour leaders.
Judging from the literature reviewed, there appears to be
little agreement with regard to the future status of the
NDP-Labour relationship.

Must this relationship be changed,

maintained, or ended?
It is important to note that missing in the literature
review are the views of rank and file trade unionists.

Not

surprisingly, this apparent failure to listen to their own
members’ views on political issues partially explains why
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labour leaders have had very little impact on the voting
behaviour of their members.

As well, the NDP in the 1990s

has driven away many of its supporters because of its
inability to formulate a coherent and workable political
program.
The literature review clearly uncovered evidence which
suggests that the organizational structure of the NDP has
contributed to the party's electoral decline and its souring
relationship with labour. The viability of the NDP's
integrated structure, its financial structure, and its rules
dictating policy development are all suspect and warrant
further investigation. The following chapters, therefore,
will address these problems and from them construct an
alternative, and more practical, organizational model for
the NDP.
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THE 1993 FEDERAL ELECTION

CHAPTER THREE
The serious decline of the federal NDP during the 1993
campaign has required the party to re-examine itself.
Certainly, there are many factors responsible for the NDP's
decline.

Some people, such as Howard Pawley and Judy

Rebick, have argued that the NDP failed miserably in 1993
because it was seen as simply another traditional party, no
different than the Conservatives or the Liberals.

Still

others, such as Steven Langdon, have suggested that the
federal NDP failed to gather any momentum during the
campaign because of unpopular provincial NDP governments in
British Columbia and Ontario.

Additionally, it has been

argued by Alan Whitehorn that the party did poorly because
it had to contend with right-wing populism (the Reform
Party) not seen since the Social Credit Party during the
early eighties.
Indeed, there are many factors which help to explain
why the NDP performed so poorly in 1993.

This chapter,

however, will argue that there were two critical factors
responsible for the NDP's poor showing in 1993.

The first

was the NDP's attempts to obtain the support of labour
leaders and their respective organizations.

Labour, after

all, pressured the federal NDP to focus on the free trade
issue in 1993 even though it was not a major concern of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

96

voting public.(1)

Second, the NDP's organizational

structure also contributed to its electoral shortcomings in
1993.

The NDP's integrated structure meant that the Federal

Party was burdened by the records of unpopular NDP
governments in Ontario and British Columbia.

In Ontario the

impact of the Rae government's passage of its social
contract legislation severely damaged NDP-labour relations
at a time when the Federal Party needed labour's dollars,
its organizational expertise, and its people.
Relying primarily on newspaper articles and data
compiled from The 1993 Canadian Election Study, by David A.
Northrup and Anne E. Oram, this chapter will show that the
NDP's platform managed to turn away union and non-union
voters alike in droves.

As well, it is also important to

review newspaper articles during the campaign period to
illustrate what issues
the NDP.

were being conveyed to the voters by

The 1993 Canadian Election Study, by Northrup and

Oram, has been chosen because it includes three surveys
which were conducted during the election campaign with a
large sample size of 3,775 participants.(2)

Additional

literature, including The Canadian General Election of 1993,
by Frizzell, Pammett and Westell, were also used in order
fill any remaining gaps.

Before discussing the 1993

election, however, a brief account of the factors which have
influenced voting behaviour in Canada will be presented as
an important background for this chapter.

To illustrate the
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uniqueness of voting behaviour in Canada, comparisons with
culturally similar states will be presented as well.

Voting Behaviour
The factors which have influenced voting behaviour have
been truly unique to Canada when compared to other liberal
democratic states.

Specifically, in most other countries

social class has been a key determinant influencing voting
behaviour.(3)

Even when compared to other Anglo-American

countries, which are culturally similar to Canada, social
class plays a very marginal role in shaping voting behaviour
in Canada.(4)

Unlike Canada, in Great Britain and

Australia, the British Labour Party (BLP) and the Australian
Labour Party (ALP) are solidly linked to the working class
segment of society.

The BLP, however, has enjoyed the

highest level of class voting.

In Australia the party's

deep historic roots have made it the party of choice not
only of the working class, but of the middle class as well.
As Robert Alford points out, "From

the beginning of

Australia as a nation in 1901, the Labor Party has existed
as a political force and has therefore shaped the political
traditions of Australia

"(5)

Based upon a number of class

voting studies, Alford contends that amongst Anglo-American
states, Great Britain has the highest level of class voting,
followed by Australia in second place, the United States
third, and Canada fourth.(6)
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There are many reasons why there has been a
particularly low degree of class consciousness exhibited by
Canadians.

The first is that Canada's geographic size has

traditionally meant that voting behaviour has often been
determined by regional considerations.

An Albertan, for

example, employed in the oil industry would more likely be
concerned over oil prices than a Newfoundlander earning a
similar income employed in the fishing industry.

Canadian

political parties recognizing that regional diversity plays
a key part in influencing voting behaviour have operated on
brokerage principles.

In other words, parties attempt to

create a coalition of various interests during election
time.

Traditionally, although not exclusively, this has

been reflected by the Liberal Party's success in Quebec and
in many urban centres in Ontario, whereas the Conservatives
have fared better in rural Ontario and the West.

As for the

NDP, it has enjoyed limited success in Western Canada,
particularly in Saskatchewan and British Columbia.

It is

important to note that the federal NDP, despite all its
efforts, has been unable to make significant gains in
Central and Eastern Canada.
The second major determinant influencing voting
behaviour in Canada has been ethnicity.

Quebecers, for

example, have tended to vote solidly for one party during
federal elections.

Since the time of Wilfrid Laurier up

until the Trudeau era, Quebecers voted solidly for the

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

99

Liberal Party (1896 to 1984).(7)

Suddenly, and quite

dramatically, the Conservatives led by a Quebecer, Brian
Mulroney, were able to win an overwhelming majority of
Quebec seats in 1984.

Mulroney's success in Quebec can be

attributed to his alliance with many Quebec nationalists and
specifically with his promise to amend the Constitution in a
manner that would satisfy Quebec's constitutional demands.
In 1988, the Conservatives were able to repeat their strong
showing, winning 60 of 72 seats in Quebec.

However, the

death of the Meech Lake Accord coupled with its unpopular
successor, the Charlottetown Accord, drove many of the
Conservatives' former Quebec allies away.

Under the

leadership of a former Mulroney Cabinet Minister, Lucien
Bouchard, many Quebec nationalists created the Bloc
Quebecois which went on to win 54 seats in the 1993 federal
election.

Incidently, the dramatic rise witnessed by the

Conservatives in Quebec during the eighties was matched by
the party's fall in the 1990s.

The Tories won only one seat

there in 1993.
In addition to regional and ethnic influences, voting
behaviour in Canada has been influenced, to a lesser degree,
by gender, age, religion, and between rural and urban
populations.(8)

Clearly, then, there are many determinants

which influence voting behaviour other than social class.
As a result, the NDP has been unsuccessful in its attempts
to attract the majority of so-called "ordinary” Canadians.
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Table 3.1 shows that during the 1988 federal election, most
Canadians who considered themselves as working-class, voted
for the Conservative Party rather than for the NDP.
table also shows that only

The

16.4 percent of those

individuals who considered themselves as middle-class voted
for the NDP, compared to 60.9 percent for the Conservatives.
Similarly, table 3.2 shows that during the 1988 federal
election, the NDP finished a distant third to both the
Conservatives and the Liberals as the party of choice
amongst Canadians with family incomes below 25,000.

Table 3.1
Subjective Social Class and Vote in the 1988 Federal
Election
Middle Class

Working Class

Total

73.2%

26.8%

Liberal
PC
NDP
Other

27.3
50.9
16.4
5.3

26.1
39.8
29.5
4.6

Source: Walter L. White, Ronald H. Wagenberg and Ralph
Nelson, Introduction to Canadian Politics and Government,
sixth edition (Canada: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994),
p.137.
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Table 3-2

Family Income and Vote in the 19SS Federal Election
Less Than
$10 000
Total

7.4%

Liberal
PC
NDP
Other

32.0
46.7
15.5
5.8

$10 00025 000

$25 000
50 000

Over
$50 000

29.8%

44.9%

17.9%

27.6
48.2
19.6
4.6

26.8
45.6
21.6
6.0

26.3
56.3
14.7
2.7

Source: Walter L. White, Ronald H . Wagenberg and Ralph
Nelson, Introduction to Canadian Politics and Government,
sixth edition (Canada : Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994) ,
p.137.
As discussed in chapter one , rank and fi3.e trade
unionists have not favoured the NDP over the Conservatives
or the Liberals.

In keeping with past trends, the NDP

failed to attract the rank and file to vote for it during
the 1988 election campaign.

This happened despite the fact

that the labour leadership had solidly backed the NDP during
the campaign.

As well, free trade, vehemently opposed by

labour leaders, became the major issue of the 1988 election.
Although the NDP did receive its highest level of

support

both in terms of popular vote and seats won (20.4% of the
vote and 43 seats), more rank and file trade unionists voted
Conservative or Liberal than they did for the NDP (Table
3.3} .
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Table 3.3

Family Member in Labour Union and Vote in the 1988 Federal
Election
Yes

NO

45.6%
26.6
43.7
24 .9
4.8

Total
Liberal
PC
NDP
Other

54.4%
29.3
50.3
15-0
5.5

Source: Walter L. White, Ronald H. Wagenberg, and Ralph
Nelson, Introduction to Canadian Politics and Government,
sixth edition (Canada: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994),
p.137.
Not surprisingly, then, the NDP was not the party of
choice for the rank and file in 1993 as well.

The

difference, unfortunately for the NDP, was that with the
entrance of the Reform Party and Bloc Quebecois, it was no
longer the only viable alternative to the Conservatives and
the Liberals.

In other words, the NDP lost its monopoly,

and consequently its image, as a protest party challenging
the other two traditional parties.

This would have major

implications for the NDP in 1993, especially in the West
where Reform became its most serious opponent.
Many academics, most notably Brodie and Jenson, have
argued that the NDP has failed to secure working class
support because it has not challenged the conventional
definition of politics as defined by the Liberals and the
Conservatives.(9)

Consequently, this has meant that the

politics of regionalism and ethnicity, rather than class,
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have continued to prevail in Canada.

Brodie and Jenson’s

assessment, however, is exaggerated.

It assumes that a

political party is capable of shaping the long-term values
of a heterogenous and regionally diverse country.

Even in

many western European states, where there has been a much
higher level of class consciousness, this has occurred
because of Europe's feudal roots and the homogeneity of most
European states.

Lipset points out that:

ethnic differences—

"Religious and

have correlated with socioeconomic

divisions, so that there has been an admixture of class and
ethnic support.” (10)

The absence of religious and

aristocratic privilege combined with the notion that social
mobility is possible has clearly inhibited the development
of class awareness in Canada.

In short, political parties

reflect the views and values of society rather than vice
versa.

If they choose not to reflect or articulate clearly

those views and values, they will not be as electorally
successful as planned.
As for the federal NDP, the majority of its support and
seats have traditionally come from the rural regions of
Western Canada, rather than from industrial workers.

Many

of these people are self-employed farmers, not employees,
and in many cases they are, in fact, employers.

Hence, the

NDP, unlike many other social democratic parties has been
largely dependent on the petit bourgeois for its support.
This explains, in part, why the party has never challenged
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private ownership or aroused class consciousness, preferring
instead to focus on the redistribution of wealth within the
capitalist system.
The fact that the NDP is made up of a coalition of
various interests further restricts the party’s ability to
formulate a coherent political platform.

More often than

not, these competing interests collide with one anotherFor example, the NDP has traditionally received support from
labour and many environmental groups.

Should the party then

support further logging projects in environmentally
sensitive areas which create jobs and steady employment for
union workers?

Or, should the NDP support the preservation

of Canada's forests to appease the environmentalists?

These

difficulties are only further complicated for the federal
NDP because it has to devise an electoral strategy which
addresses the concerns, and sometimes conflicting interests,
which vary from region to region.

Unfortunately, this has

meant that the NDP was seriously inhibited in its ability to
devise new policies during the 1993 election campaign. The
party appeared satisfied to fight "against" change, such as
proposals to reduce the deficit, instead of proposing any
policy alternatives of its own.

In the past, by either

fighting against Liberal and Conservative policies, or
defending the status quo, the party had been able to hold on
to its loose coalition of supporters.

However, economic

recession and rising government debt and deficits in the
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1990s made the NDP's calls for further spending on
government programs increasingly unpopular among voters,
including union members.
Although there is general agreement that the NDP must
re-examine itself or face the possibility of political
extinction, it appears that several key issues are being
overlooked.

The literature reviewed in chapter two shows

that little has been said about reasons why rank and file
trade unionists have not been voting for the NDP.

Moreover,

there is the inaccurate assumption that the political views
of labour leaders are similar to the views of the rank and
file.

For example, Desmond Morton states that during the

1993 election "Provincial public sector workers in
particular, many of them strong supporters of the NDP in the
past, did not want to hear about recessions, deficits,
rising health care costs or public opinion."(11)

Using the

1993 Canadian Election S t udy , this chapter will show that

Morton's assessment is incorrect.

Furthermore, it will be

argued that if the NDP hopes to rebuild, it must devise a
strategy that also addresses the concerns of the rank and
file rather than just labour leaders.

The 1993 Election Campaign
With respect to labour-party relations, the federal NDP
had several obstacles to overcome in 1993.

First, just

prior to the election campaign, there was dissention within
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the party's caucus over its position toward the Rae
government in Ontario. In the spring of 1993 Steven Langdon,
MP for the Windsor riding of Essex-Windsor, criticized the
Ontario NDP government's social contract legislation and Bob
Rae's increasing concern over the province's deficit.(12)
Langdon's criticism of Rae was not acceptable to Audrey
McLaughlin and she stripped Langdon of his position as the
party's finance critic for his statements.

However, Langdon

did secure the support of his own constituency's largest and
most influential labour organization, the Canadian Auto
Workers (CAW).

The Langdon affair had a negative impact on

overall NDP-labour relations.

For many labour leaders,

McLaughlin's failure to criticize the Rae government's
social contract combined with her decision

to strip Langdon

of his duties as the party's finance critic only further
complicated an already strained relationship between the
party and labour.
Second, and more importantly, the federal party was
prepared to follow labour's advice and focus on the issue of
free trade.

Clearly, table 3.4 shows that both union and

non-union voters alike held negative views with regard to
free trade.
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Table 3.4

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES

Support
Oppose

Union

Non-Union

34%
5S

42%
47

UNEMPLOYMENT HAS INCREASED BECAUSE OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Union
Agree
Disagree

69%
23

Non-Union
60%
30

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO
(NAFTA)

Support
Oppose

Union

Non-Union

23%
67

30%
56

NEW AGREEMENT NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN POSITION

Agree
Disagree

Union

Non-Union

29%
49

36%
39

Source: The data comes from The 1993 Canadian Election Study

However, this issue was not considered very important to
most of the electorate.

In fact, when asked what the most

important campaign issue was both union and non-union
individuals responded that jobs (37% union, 30% non-union)
were most important.

Ranking second behind jobs amongst

respondents was the deficit followed in third place by
health care.

Interestingly, of the 68 different issues
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identified by the respondents, the Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) and NAFTA finished near the bottom of the list.

Only

0.2 percent of union and 0.3 percent of all non-union
respondents identified these two issues as being most
important to them.

Other studies, such as those found in

The Canadian General Election of 1993, also show similar
rankings as well.(13)
Obviously there was a clear division between labour
leaders, who wanted free trade to be a major campaign issue,
and the rank and file, who saw jobs, the deficit and health
care as their greatest concerns.

Rank and file trade

unionists, after all, are also taxpayers, investors, and
mortgage holders etc..

They, unlike their labour leaders,

were concerned over a wide range of issues, all of which
have an impact on their own financial situation.

This

separation between labour leaders and their members has
always hurt the NDP electorally.

In 1993, it devastated the

party because it was no longer the only serious political
alternative to the Liberals and the Conservatives.
With a political platform failing to address the key
issues in the minds of most voters, the NDP stumbled through
the 1993 election campaign.

Consequently, press coverage

for the party was also minimal and its popularity appeared
stuck early into the campaign at around 10 percent.
Unfortunately for the federal NDP, the Rae

government in

Ontario received a substantial amount of unfavourable press
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coverage.

With the election campaign only one day old, the

Toronto Star reported that Rae's offers to help McLaughlin
"...makes some of McLaughlin's labor supporters cringe, in
the wake of Rae's social contract cuts."(14)

In the same

article Sid Ryan, Ontario division President of CUPE was
quoted as saying:

"The best thing Rae could do for Audrey

is go up to his cottage and stay there for the duration of
this election."(15)

That same day, the Windsor Star

reported that the Canadian Auto Workers intended to support
the federal party despite its opposition to the Rae
government.

However, the paper also reported:

"The big

question is whether the foot soldiers of the labor movement
will be able to bring much commitment and enthusiasm to the
task, after the general disillusionment with Ontario's NDP
government."(16)

Therefore, in the first days of the

election campaign, the press coverage received by the NDP
was based as much on party-labour conflict at the provincial
level, as on party-labour unity at the federal level.
The media continued to focus their coverage on labourparty conflict while tying these reports together to the
federal party's election campaign.

On September 11, 1993

the Toronto Star reported that Rae and McLaughlin agreed to
fight against free trade.(17)

However, in the same article

McLaughlin's advice to Ontario unionists fighting

Rae was

that they "will have to sort it out with the Premier."
McLaughlin’s reluctance to comment on the Ontario
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government's record only further discouraged union activists
from helping the federal party.
During the second week of the campaign, the media
continued to focus on how R a e 's social contract with labour
was having a negative impact on the federal party.

The

Windsor Star reported that Liz Barkley, head of the Ontario
Secondary School Teachers' Federation, had indicated that
there were fewer of her union activists helping the federal
NDP in 1993 than in the past.(18)

As well, the same article

reported that Sid Ryan (Ontario head of CUPE) announced that
his union would only donate money and personnel to
individual NDP candidates rather than contributing funds
directly to the federal party.
As for the campaign itself, the NDP continued to focus
on the free trade issue.

McLaughlin began stepping up her

attacks on the Liberals because of Chretien's uncertain
position on NAFTA.(19)

Furthermore, the party's own

television campaign ads focussed on free trade along with
other issues such as health care and unemployment.
Moreover, the ads ended with an anti-Ottawa statement:
"Ottawa hasn't got the message - Send it.

Vote NDP."

Unfortunately, since the NDP was now seen as one of the
three traditional parties

its commercial ads were pushing

potential NDP voters to the Reform Party instead of to the
N D P . (20)
With ineffective campaign ads and a party platform not
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addressing the key issues, support for the NDP continued to
fall.

By the third week of the campaign, CTV news reported

that the NDP had the support of six percent of decided
voters.(21)

Faced with the possibility of falling below the

12 seats required to maintain official party status in the
House of Commons, the NDP began looking for other campaign
issues.

McLaughlin began spending more time discussing the

party's $15 billion, five year infrastructure program and
its $4 billion proposed child care program.

However, unlike

the Liberals, these new spending programs were not being
matched with a commitment to cut government spending, an
issue that had been the second most important of the
campaign.
Although most labour leaders did not favour deficit
reduction by way of spending cuts, most of the rank and file
did support such cuts.

Even when asked about specific

issues such as welfare and unemployment insurance, union
members responded almost exactly as did non-union people in
the survey (Table 3.5).

Table 3.5 shows that both groups

(union and non-union) supported at least some spending cuts
to some previously "untouchable" programs, welfare and
unemployment insurance.

However, when questioned about what

would happen to the deficit with an NDP victory (45% union,
46% non-union), most responded that the deficit would
increase.

By contrast, only a small percentage of

respondents (12% union, 11% non-union) believed that the
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deficit would decrease under an NDP government.(22)

Table 3.5

CUT SPENDING > WELFARE

A Lot
Some
Not At All

Union

Non-union

22%
48
29

21%
47
29

COT SPENDING > UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

A Lot
Some
Not At All
Source:
Study.

Union

Non-union

8%
46
44

10%
45
42

The data comes from The 1993 Canadian Election

Not surprisingly, when those participating in the
survey were asked which party they would support, the NDP
finished in fifth spot (table 3.6).

Obviously, the party's

stance on NAFTA and health care may have been well-received
by labour leaders and other interest groups.

However, the

rank and file continued to leave the NDP for the Liberals,
the Reform Party, and the Bloc Quebecois.

Since the Bloc

ran candidates only in Quebec, the 12 percent union support
received is in actual fact many times higher than that
amount.

For the NDP, however, the Reform Party's 10 percent

support among the rank and file posed a far greater concern
for it.

The Reform Party was beginning to seriously

challenge the NDP in all of the 19 seats that the party held
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in British Columbia.

Similarly, Reform's presence in

Manitoba and Saskatchewan began to threaten NDP incumbents
in these provinces as well.

Although the NDP has never

obtained significant rank and file trade union support, its
6 percent support among trade unionists (see table 3.6) was
still only half of what the pro-NAFTA and generally
unpopular Conservative Party received in the same survey.

Table 3.6

PARTY THINK WILL VOTE FOR
Conservative
Liberal
NDP
Reform
Bloc
Other

Union
12%
25
6
10
12
3

Non-Union
16%
26
4
13
7
2

Source:
The 1993 Canadian Election Study.
Percentages do
not add up to 100 because those respondents undecided or
refusing to answer are not listed.
By week four of the election campaign, the NDP appeared
stuck at about 6 percent support.(23)

Instead of trying to

secure the 12 seats needed to retain official party status,
the NDP continued to try to win some seats in Ontario.

For

example, at a rally in Windsor, Ontario, McLaughlin
described Langdon as one of "the most effective MPs in
Ottawa."(24)

This despite the fact that McLaughlin had

stripped Langdon of his duties as finance critic prior to
the campaign.

The party also began placing more attention
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on health care.

The NDP's new political ads asked:

Liberals let you down on free trade.
on health care?"(25)

Will

"The

they let you down

The Toronto Star reported that

McLaughlin referred to the protection of medicare and other
social programs as the "fight of (her) life."(26)
McLaughlin's crusade, however, to save health care
stalled badly from the very beginning.

With less than two

weeks remaining in the campaign, McLaughlin was seen
discussing the importance of preserving health care while at
one of the health centres facing a 4.4 percent cut in its
$20 million annual budget by the Rae government.(27)

The

incident, well publicized by the media, further damaged the
NDP's credibility on yet another election issue.
Shawn Mendes's report, printed just days before the
election in the Globe & Mail, sums up best the
disillusionment felt by many New Democrats
electoral strategy.

over the party's

Referring to the NDP's political

platform he argues the following:
Policies such as these make federal NDP
leader Audrey McLaughlin look like Alice
in Wonderland - well intentioned, but
also far from reality that Canadians cannot
take her, or her party, seriously
The
New Democrats could have seized the deficit
as their issue.
Debt-servicing redistributes
tax dollars from working taxpayers
to wealthy bondholders, many of whom are
offshore? fighting the deficit therefore
would be an egalitarian cause.(28)
Certainly, had the NDP been committed to fighting the
deficit, it could have possibly stemmed the flow of many New

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

115

Democrats switching over to Reform in Western Canada.

After

all, a few years earlier Roy Romanow became the NDP premier
of Saskatchewan by promising to balance his province's
budget.

However, federal party strategists understood that

a campaign centring on deficit reduction would have angered
many of Ontario's labour leaders, who were still fighting
Rae over the social contract.

Thus, the federal NDP's

attempt to gain the support of labour leaders not only
failed to lead to electoral support,

it also hurt the party

in the West where the majority of its incumbents were
fighting for their political lives.
On election night, October 25th 1993, the NDP finished
with 6.9 percent of the vote and just nine seats.(29)

In

Ontario, the party failed to win a single seat after sending
ten New Democrats to Ottawa in 1938.

One blue-collar riding

after another in Ontario fell to the Liberals on election
night.

The ridings of Nickel Belt, Sault Ste. Marie,

Thunder Bay - Atikokan and Timmins - Chapleau went
decisively Liberal.

In the working-class riding of Oshawa,

more voters preferred the Reform Party than the NDP.(30)
Interestingly, even Steven Langdon lost in his riding of
Essex-Windsor.

Langdon, the first New Democrat MP to

publicly criticize Rae's social contract, had received solid
labour backing from the powerful Canadian Auto Workers.
Langdon's loyalty to his labour allies, however, did not
prevent him from being defeated.

In fact, his Liberal
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opponent defeated him by a margin of nearly two to one.(31)
Certainly, Langdon's defeat illustrates that labour's
dollars and campaign assistance alone could not have saved
the NDP in Ontario.

Conclusion
During the 1993 election campaign the NDP's political
platform offered little to interest the rank and file to
vote for it.

In the past, the NDP could have simply

retained its core base of support by fighting for more
social programs or condemning corporate profits.
however, was no longer the case by 1993.

This,

Union and non

union voters alike were fearful for their jobs and concerned
about Canada's ballooning debt.

Instead of listening to the

concerns of the voter, the NDP preferred to devise an
unimaginative and safe political strategy, so as not to
offend its allies in the labour movement as well as other
special interest groups.

As a result, the NDP stumbled

through the 1993 election campaign still opposing free
trade, often defending the status quo, and promising even
more costly government programs.
The NDP, obviously, believed that it would have been
politically advantageous to forge ties with organized
labour, ignoring the fact that labour leaders have
historically failed to influence the voting behaviour of
their members♦

On the other hand, public-sector unions and
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the CAW were less than enthusiastic in their support for the
federal NDP.

These unions openly questioned their support

for the party during the 1993 election campaign.

Although

the private-sector unions continued to fully support the
federal party, their size and strength could not make up the
void left by the public-sector unions.

The dismal electoral

showing by the NDP in 1993 has finally forced the party and
organized labour to

seriously re-assess their relationship

with one another.
Finally, it is obvious that the Federal Party was
handicapped during the 1993 federal election because of its
integrated structure.

Financial contributions to the

Federal Party were reduced because donations to the party's
provincial wings had steadily declined as a result of the
unpopularity of several provincial NDP governments.
Additionally, party activists, including trade unionists and
other NDP supporters, were shying away from the Federal
Party because of its close organizational relationship with
its unpopular provincial wings.

Lastly, throughout the

election, the Federal Party could not articulate its program
because of the controversy it was forced to address
surrounding the Rae government's social contract legislation
in Ontario.
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NDP-LABOUR RELATIONS AFTER 1993

CHAPTER FOUR
Since the 1993 federal election, New Democrats have
been reevaluating their ties with organized labour.

Labour,

too, has been eager to redefine its place in politics.

The

divisions which exist within the labour movement and within
the NDP, however, have only further complicated a very
difficult renewal process.

For example, private sector

unions have continued to view the NDP as a valuable ally.
On the other hand, the CAW and the public-sector unions have
sought alternative political strategies.

As for the NDP,

there are many who believe that the party’s ties with labour
are outdated and detrimental.

Still, there are others

within the party who believe that the continuation of NDPlabour relations is vital for the party's long-term
political survival.
When examining NDP-labour relations during the post1993 period, it is first necessary to look at the records of
Canada's provincial NDP governments.

This is because the

NDP is an integrated party, meaning that there is no clear
separation between the party's federal and provincial wings.
Moreover, because the majority of labour related legislation
falls under provincial jurisdiction, it is often the
legislative objectives of provincial NDP governments which
have shaped NDP-labour relations.

This also explains, in
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part, why labour has set up its own federations along
provincial lines.
Based upon the performances of provincial NDP
governments in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Ontario,
it will be argued that it remains politically advantageous
for labour to support the NDP.

Moreover, this chapter will

show that as long as the CAW and the public-sector unions
continue to distance themselves from the NDP, they threaten
to lose their ability to influence public policy.

As for

the NDP, it will be argued that it must pursue a political
agenda which balances the interests of labour with the
values and concerns of the majority of Canadians.

To

successfully accomplish this task, it will be argued that
the NDP must make a number of structural changes.

The

structural changes proposed in this chapter include
transforming the NDP into a confederal party, increasing
labour's participation within the party, and allowing for
the admission of cross-regional factions.

Goldman's

transaction theory, moreover, will be employed to help
explain how these changes can enhance the effectiveness of
NDP-labour relations in the future.

The Social Contract:

The NDP-Labour relationship in Crisis

In the summer of 1994, the CAW announced that it was
withdrawing its support for the NDP in Ontario.(1)

The

CAW's decision was in response to the Rae government's
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decision to pass the Social Contract Act (Bill 48).

The

social contract was criticized by both the CAW and the
public sector unions because it legislated a unilateral
roll-back of existing collective agreements.(2)

More

seriously, these unions felt betrayed by a government which
they helped to elect in 1990.

Reflecting this sense of

betrayal, the Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL) argued that
R a e ’s social contract

"ensured reassessment"

relationship with the NDP.(3)

of its

Although there was a great

deal of criticism expressed by labour over the social
contract, not all labour organizations were as eager to
criticize the Rae government.

In fact, during both the 1993

federal election and the 1995 Ontario provincial election,
the majority of private sector unions continued to endorse
the NDPThe divisions which have existed within the labour
movement, over the issue of whether or not to support the
NDP, have had a significant impact on overall labour unity.
The issue has caused rifts between union locals and their
national councils, it has also caused serious divisions
within the OFL, and it has similarly threatened the
cohesiveness of the CLC.

Within the labour movement two

opposing camps have emerged.

The first is comprised of

Canada’s largest private sector union, the CAW, and the
majority of public sector unions.

The second is led by the

Steelworkers and includes a number of other large labour
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organizations including the Communications, Energy and
Paperworkers Union of Canada, the United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union, and various other union
organizations and union locals.(4)
In addition to viewing the social contract as an
assault on existing public sector agreements, the CAW and
the public sector unions believed that it placed the blame
for Ontario's deficit on the backs of public sector workers.
According to one CAW discussion paper "...the government
soon began sounding like other governments, making
judgements based on expediency, and putting the main focus
on the deficit," and "The NDP was essentially teaching the
most dangerous lesson of all:

there is nothing we can

really do; the right is right."(5)

In other words, the CAW

accused the Rae government of accepting a neo-conservative
notion that the size of government had to be reduced.

In

fact, however, the social contract was an attempt by the Rae
government to save jobs, thereby preserving the size of the
provincial bureaucracy.
Jim Stanford, an economist for the CAW has argued that
government deficits and accumulated debt are major problems.
However, he contends that it was a problem brought about by
neo-conservative fiscal policy, not because of public sector
wages.(6)

He also points

out that fighting the deficit on

the backs of workers or by cutting social programs are
meaningless and unacceptable.

Instead, he contends, changes
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in neo-conservative fiscal policy must be made in order to
reduce government deficits.

The NDP's unwillingness to

challenge the existing workings of the free-market economy
has led Stanford to conclude that the party offers little
more than "Neo-Liberalism Light".(7)

Consequently, he has

criticized NDP governments for their handling of the current
economic crisis.

Specifically, Stanford accuses provincial

NDP governments of promising the same solutions as other
pro-business governments.

The only apparent difference,

however, is that the NDP has presented itself as a party
that could somehow implement spending cuts in a fairer and
more humane manner.(8)
Stanford's explanation of why government deficits and
debt have become such a large problem does have its merits.
Indeed, pursuing fiscal policy which ensures high interest
rates as a method to curb inflationary pressures leads to an
increase in interest payments required to service government
debt.

As well, high interest rates reduce consumer demand

for goods because the cost of borrowing money becomes too
high in relation to inflation.

The overall impact of

reducing consumer demand to combat inflation has led to
significant layoffs in those sectors which produce consumer
goods.

Unfortunately, this has also meant that many of the

former taxpayers and consumers, now unemployed, become
dependent on the state in order to survive.

This increase

in the demand for social assistance has only added another
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financial burden for governments to contend with.
Certainly, drastic changes in fiscal policy need to be
made.

However, because such fiscal changes can only occur

at the federal level, it is unfair to condemn provincial NDP
governments for a lack of action.

During the 1995 Ontario

provincial election, for example, Hargrove had been quoted
as saying: "...the only way to reduce government debt
effectively is to lower interest rates.

High rates only

help international i n v e s t o r s 9) Therefore, the CAW's
criticism of the Rae government was seriously misguided
because it condemned the government for not acting on issues
which it, in fact, had no jurisdictional control over.
This leads to an important question:

Even though the Rae

government's social contract undermined collective
bargaining agreements, should the CAW and the public sector
unions have withdrawn their support for the NDP in Ontario?
Instead of abandoning the NDP, the CAW and public sector
unions should have continued to support the NDP in public,
while working behind closed doors to work out more
acceptable public sector agreements.

Such an alternative

strategy would have had both short-term and long-term
advantages.
In the short-term, continued support for the NDP could
have helped the federal party during the 1993
campaign.

election

In 1988, for instance, the NDP received 24.9

percent of the union vote.

However, in 1993 the NDP
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received only 6 percent of the
a decline of 18.9 percent.

vote from unionized workers,

As well, the federal NDP was

constantly pressured by labour to respond and somehow
resolve the controversial social contract issue.

More

seriously, during the 1995 Ontario provincial election, the
CAW and the public sector unions' unwillingness to help the
NDP only contributed to the election of a right-wing
government which promised to make substantial cuts in the
public sector.
In the long-term, continued support for the NDP could
have led to the development of alternative economic
strategies with which labour could have been directly
involved.

After all, it was the Rae government which passed

Bill 40, considered by the labour movement as one of the
most progressive pieces of labour legislation in North
America.(10)

Similarly, with labour as an ally, rather than

a foe, it could have worked with the NDP to build and
improve upon other pieces of legislation, such as pay equity
and employment equity.

Instead, the CAW and its public

sector allies have chosen to work outside Canada's social
democratic party.
In contrast, the private-sector unions, led by the
Steelworkers, have chosen to remain supportive of the NDP.
Unlike the public sector unions and the CAW, they favour
working with the NDP to develop alternative economic
strategies, including a reduced work week, co-ownership, and
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a greater say in training and management decisions.(11)
Furthermore, among the private sector unions there is a
general acceptance that tough budgetary decisions have to be
made.(12)

In response to the CAW and the public sector

unions position towards the NDP, Leo Gerard has argued:
"Surely there are more effective ways of responding to this
crisis than with empty rhetoric and withdrawing of support
for provincial NDP governments."(13) Clearly, the rift
between the CAW-public sector unions, and the private sector
unions cannot be underestimated.

Interestingly, however,

during the Ontario election campaign both the CAW and
certain public sector unions softened their position when it
became frighteningly clear that the Tories were poised to
win the provincial election.

The 1995 Ontario Provincial Election
The defeat of the Ontario NDP government on June 8,
1995 provides important lessons for both the NDP and the
labour movement.

It illustrates that fighting with one

another does nothing to advance the objectives of either
side.

The NDP clearly underestimated the impact that

opening public sector agreements would have on party-labour
relations.

However, labour should have accepted the fact

that the government's deficit had ballooned and immediate
measures were necessary.

Unfortunately, in November 1993

the OFL, under tremendous pressure from the CAW and the
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public sector unions, demanded that the Rae government
repeal Bill 48.(14) It also suggested that the labour
movement develop alternative political strategies, including
developing broad based social coalitions to influence all
governments.(15)
deeply divided.

Behind the scenes, though, the OFL was
More specifically, within the OFL the

majority of private sector unions had supported an
alternative resolution which would have endorsed the NDP
despite the social contract.
Meanwhile, the tensions between the public sector
unions and the NDP continued to mount.

On the one hand,

there were the public sector unions who felt betrayed by the
Rae government.

On the other hand, there was an

inexperienced NDP government scrambling to deal with a
recession that it had greatly underestimated.

When the

government announced that Ontarians would be going to the
polls on June 8, 1995 labour was left in a difficult
position:

It could support the NDP in its bid to be re

elected, or it could watch the party be defeated by
political opponents committed to implementing deep budgetary
cuts and massive layoffs in the public sector.
Almost immediately labour appeared to be softening its
position with regard to the NDP.

Although it never did

officially endorse the party during the campaign, CAW
president Buzz Hargrove was quoted as saying:
will be screaming—

"Bay Street

They will do everything they can to
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ensure the N D P ’s defeat."(16)

Moreover, OFL president

Gordon Wilson announced that he was personally supporting
the Rae government despite his federation's refusal to
officially endorse the party.(17)
Interestingly, while many labour leaders were
disappointed by the Rae government's performance, an
Environics poll released on April 20, 1995 showed that most
Ontarians thought that women’s groups, the poor, and labour
unions had been the primary beneficiaries of the NDP
government.(18)

The same poll also showed that 56 percent

of middle-class Ontarians strongly disagreed or disagreed
that the Rae government represented them.(19)

In addition,

the poll showed that Ontarians wanted the government’s top
priorities to be promoting economic growth (32%), reducing
the provincial deficit (28%), and maintaining social and
health programs (17%).(20)

Obviously, while Rae's social

contract isolated many of the NDP's traditional labour
supporters, it was still seen by most Ontarians as a party
which represented labour’s interests.

Furthermore, the Rae

government’s attempt to fight the deficit was seen as a
half-hearted attempt to curb spending by those who wouldn’t
have voted NDP anyway.
In addition to budgetary problems, the NDP had to
contend with a sluggish economy.

Those on the right blamed

NDP programs and policies, such as the jobsOntario training
program, employment equity, and the government’s anti-scab
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legislation for Ontario's poor economic performance.
Instead of directing its criticism towards federal fiscal
policies, the disgruntled left chose to blame the Rae
government.

Consequently, attacks from both the left and

the right only further reduced the Rae government's
credibility insofar as being capable of managing the
economy.

To complicate matters further for the NDP, many

labour leaders in the public sector, such as Sid Ryan,
CUPE's Ontario president, warned during the election
campaign:

"If the NDP wins, I expect there will be a move

by labor to start a new party."(21)
however,

Private sector unions,

continued to remain loyal to Rae.

In fact, the

party reported that it was 20 percent better financed from
unions in 1995, than it had been in 1990.(22)
With less than three weeks remaining in the campaign,
serious cracks began to emerge at the highest levels of the
OFL.

Julie Davis, OFL secretary-treasurer and former CUPE

member announced that she intended to run against Gord
Wilson for the federation's presidency.(23)

Relations

between the two had reportedly soured when Wilson announced
his support for the Rae government.

While labour remained

divided, an Angus Reid Poll released May 27 placed the
Tories in the lead with 39 percent support, the Liberals
with 35 percent support, and the NDP with 21 percent
support.(24)

As it became increasingly clear that the

Tories were poised to win the election, many union locals
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broke ranks with their national organizations.

Moreover,

even those unions which continued to oppose Rae began
warning of unrest if the next government intended to repeal
Bill 40 (labour legislation which banned the use of
replacement workers and made it easier for workers to
organize).

With a week remaining in the campaign, a number

of CAW locals were actively campaigning for the NDP.

Gabe

MacNally, vice-president for CAW local 199 in St.
Catharines, for example, referred to Hargrove's refusal to
endorse the NDP in the following manner:

"As a responsible

leader, I think there's no option but for him to come out
and support the NDP in this campaign."(25)

As well, despite

Sid Ryan's threats to establish a labour party if the NDP
was re-elected, John Murphy of CUPE local 1000 (at Ontario
Hydro) announced that he was advising his members to vote
ND P . (26)

Moreover, the CLC's president Bob White also

announced that he was endorsing the NDP.

On election night,

however, the Conservatives won a convincing majority
government with a platform which promised massive layoffs in
the public sector, drastic cuts in government spending, and
lower taxes.
In response to the NDP's electoral defeat, Paul
McKeague argues in his insightful article:

"Solidarity will

bloom once more as labor defends the poor, denounces
injustice, chats catchy slogans against tax breaks for the
rich and feels good about itself again."(27)

He continues
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by adding:

"Labor has never had such a sympathetic ear at

Queen's Park, but the Rae government's modest achievements
fell far short of the socialist Valhalla that danced in the
heads of many of its labor supporters."(28)

Unfortunately,

the decision by public sector union leaders to oppose Rae
will have significant long-term implications for their
members.

For example, instead of unpaid days off and wage

roll-backs, many public sector workers will receive their
layoff notices.

Instead of pay equity, women will continue

to make less than their male counterparts.

Instead of

employment equity, visible minorities, women, the disabled
and aboriginal peoples will once again have to compete in an
environment that has traditionally discriminated against
them.

As well, many constituencies with large unionized

populations no longer have access to MPPs sympathetic to
labour issues.

For example, the NDP lost three of its four

seats in Hamilton and two of its three seats in Windsor.

In

Oshawa NDP incumbent Allan Pilkey lost his seat by a margin
of nearly two to one to his Progressive Conservative
opponent.(29)

A Formula For Success:

The NDP in Saskatchewan

In the midst of a number of devastating electoral
setbacks suffered by the NDP at the federal level and in
Ontario, one NDP government continued to enjoy considerable
success.

On June 21, 1995 the Saskatchewan NDP government,
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led by Premier Roy Romanow, won its second straight majority
government.

Roy Romanow1s success can be traced to his

government's determination to get the province's spending
under control.

In fact, Romanow’s government was the first

in Canada to balance its budget in the 1990s.(30)
some controversial decisions had to be made.

Indeed,

The government

not only increased taxes, it also cut spending by
eliminating many rural hospitals.

During the 1995 election

campaign, Romanow made no apologies for his government's
commitment to deficit fighting:

"I have no time for

somebody who says that the debt is all a fiction."(31)
Romanow's commitment to cut spending
successful.

was extremely

The province's deficit went from $840 million

in 1991 to a budget surplus of $119 million in 1995.(32)
The NDP's success in Saskatchewan paralleled closely
the demise of the Rae government in Ontario.
Romanow triumphed while Rae had failed?

Why had

First, Romanow had

promised during the 1991 election campaign to balance the
province's budget.

By contrast, Rae promised to stimulate a

sluggish Ontario economy by increasing government spending.
Unfortunately for Rae, his government's deficit spending
failed to lift Ontario's economy out of the recession.

As a

result, his party's critics were quick to attack the NDP as
fiscally incompetent.

Nevertheless, the mandates of the two

governments were very different.

However, while Rae backed

down from many of his promises, Romanow did not deviate from
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his.

Consequently, Rae's government lacked the credibility

enjoyed by Romanow's government.
The Romanow government also continued to receive strong
labour backing.

Some critics have even accused the Romanow

government of favouring unionized contractors for government
contracts even if it had meant paying a higher price.(33)
Moreover, unlike the NDP government in Ontario,
Saskatchewan's NDP government enjoys strong grass-roots
support built up over
power.

many years when the party has held

In fact, the province elected the country's first

CCF government in 1944, and since that time has dominated
Saskatchewan politics.

In Ontario, however, the NDP had to

contend with a hostile and powerful business community which
blamed it for the province's economic problems and
skyrocketing debt.

NDP-Labour Relations:

British Columbia

In British Columbia, the NDP has maintained good
relations with labour.

Although opinion polls in 1995

placed Premier Mike Harcourt's government in third place,
this was largely due to the numerous scandals which have
plagued his government.(34)

The Harcourt government has

passed numerous pieces of pro-labour legislation, including
most recently in 1995 the Employment Standards Act.

This

Act includes a number of guidelines that employers must
follow in the workplace.

For example, employers are
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required to register employees working in private residences
to ensure that the minimum standards of the Act are
enforced.(35)

As well, the Act guarantees rest and meal

breaks for employees working more than five hours in any
given day.(36)
In addition to the Employment Standards Act, the
Harcourt government has also raised the province’s minimum
wage.

As a result, it continues to receive support from the

B.C. Federation of Labour, as well as from the public sector
unions.(37)

The B.C. Government and Service Employees Union

(BCGEU), for example, remains a staunch supporter of the
Harcourt government.
Why did British Columbia's NDP government continue to
receive backing from the province’s public sector unions?
The most obvious answer is that the Harcourt government did
not unilaterally open existing collective agreements of
public sector workers.
is another explanation.

Beneath the surface, however, there
There are in fact clear ideological

differences between British Columbia's public sector unions
and their counterparts in Ontario.

During a CBC interview

in May 1995, John Shields, president of the B.C. Government
and Service Employees Union, argued that labour should
continue to support the NDP despite the social contract.(38)
He also described the divisions between labour and the NDP
as "sad” and urged those unions opposing the NDP to
cooperate with the party.(39)

Interestingly, during the
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same interview, Shields warned that when BC's unions went
against Dave Barrett's NDP government the result was that
they indirectly helped to elect a "severe" right-wing
government.(40)

When Mike Darnell from CAW Local 444 in

Windsor pointed out that his union was not providing money
to the Ontario NDP, Shields responded by asking Darnell,
"What other instrument in parliament do you have to push the
trade union agenda?"(41)
Clearly, British Columbia's public sector unions share
a view similar to Ontario's private sector unions with
regard to NDP-labour relations.

First, they both recognize

that labour's interests cannot be better served by the NDP's
political opponents.

Second, they do not see how diverting

money away from the NDP towards extra-parliamentary
coalitions instead can help labour's interests.

Third, and

finally, both recognize that fighting the NDP, even if it
means indirectly helping to elect right-wing governments, is
highly detrimental to labour's interests.

The Future of NDP-Labour Relations
Although there are many obstacles which need to be
overcome, rehabilitating NDP-labour relations must be a top
priority for both the party and the labour movement.
Certainly, the conditions for better relations exist.

The

federal Liberals* fiscal and monetary policies have proven
to be little different than their predecessors, as far as
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labour is concerned.

The separatist Bloc Quebecois is the

official opposition in Canada, and Parliament's third
largest party is more right-wing than the governing party.
In Ontario, the Rae government was defeated by a pro
business government committed to repealing some of what
labour would consider as the country's most progressive
legislation.

Additionally, the new government in Ontario

has already begun a process of slashing government spending
for welfare and subsidized housing, which many union leaders
could only describe as unacceptable.
Before improved relations between the NDP and the
labour movement can be realized, however, labour must first
overcome its internal divisions.

A labour movement divided

can do little to advance the interests of its members.
Canada's largest private sector union, the CAW, and its
public sector allies should not abandon the NDP.

Although

both the CAW and the public sector unions have already
committed themselves to participating in extra-parliamentary
social coalitions, this approach without continued support
for the NDP will reap few benefits.
As for the NDP, the debate over labour's value as an
ally has been hotly contested at the party's renewal
conferences.

In an article submitted at the NDP's December

1994 renewal conference, John Richards argues the following:
"It is simply not credible that a social democratic party
present itself as efficient managers of a generous welfare
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state, and as the political agent of public sector
unions.” (42)

He also contends that in the long run,

breaking ties with labour "...would benefit the NDP and
unions, at least private sector unions."(43)

Richards

argument, however, is flawed because it assumes that deficit
fighting equals cutting public sector workers, a sentiment
which is not shared by all New Democrats.
Ottawa MP Nelson Riis, for example, contends that
although the debt and the deficit is a problem, it is
symptom of a deeper problem, that being high
unemployment.(44)

Riis argues that while the NDP should

commit itself to balancing the budget, it should do so
lowering interest rates and focusing on job creation.

He

hopes that the party will continue to cooperate with labour.
However, he believes that the party has to change in
changing times and hopes that "

labour also changes to

reflect these realities."(45)
When asked why the NDP did so poorly in 1993, Ottawa MP
Chris Axworthy blamed the party's "out of date, old
fashioned vision" for the NDP's failures.(4 6)

He argues

that the party had not been in touch with its constituents,
preferring instead to fight battles (free trade) already
lost.(47)

More importantly, he correctly points out that

trade unionists do not vote as trade unionists.
Consequently, Axworthy believes a political platform which
appeals to the rank and file will in the long-run strengthen
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NDP-labour relations.

When asked whether he supports a

deficit fighting strategy Axworthy responded:
In my mind there is nothing more leftwing than to deal with the deficit.
It
takes money from the poor to the rich...
[it] prevents a government and a society
from using its resources for public good
and it gives money to foreign bond-holders.(48)
Unlike Nelson Riis, Axworthy insists that if the public
sector is overmanned, then he would favour public sector
cuts.

However, Axworthy points out that such cuts should

be made at the upper management levels first (ie. non-union
positions).
The way in which NDP-labour relations will evolve
ultimately depends on whether or not the two sides share
compatible goals.

Although the CAW has been an outspoken

critic of the NDP, there is evidence which suggests that the
two sides are not very far apart.

For example, the CAW has

outlined a number of social reform objectives:
What Social Reform Should B e ...
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Right to a decent job;
Transitional support in the form of income and
education/training during temporary unemployment;
The removal of barriers to work and training faced by
any group (discrimination, disabilities, part-time
work, childcare);
Adequate income maintenance for those not in the
workforce (pensions, single mothers, children, injured
workers);
Universal services (health, education, childcare).(49)

The goals outlined above are, in fact, not much different
than

the objectives outlined at the NDP's renewal
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conferences.
During the NDP's December 1994 renewal conference, the
party's mission panel agreed that its goals were to create a
society dedicated to equality, justice and democracy.(50)
The panel also agreed that the party's overriding concern
was to represent workers and the disadvantaged.(51)
Interestingly, the NDP's mission panel also expressed a
willingness to participate in extra-parliamentary social
coalitions, a strategy already utilized by the CAW and the
public sector unions.

Specifically, the mission panel

states that the party must "work with the widest possible
range of organizations, including the labour, feminist and
environmental movements, with whom we have something in
common philosophically—

"(52)

Clearly, then, the obstacles

which have plagued NDP-labour relations in recent years can
be resolved.

Both labour and the party share a common

belief in helping working people and the disadvantaged in
order to create a more egalitarian society.

The real test,

though, will be whether or not both sides can agree on how
to achieve their common goals.
To facilitate a reconciliation between labour and the
NDP, structural reform of the party is required.

Since the

1930s, CCF-NDP relations with labour have often been
tentative and precarious.

This is because the NDP's

structure makes it difficult for profitable exchanges to
occur between labour and the NDP.

According to Goldman's
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transaction theory, contributions toward an organization are
made with the expectation of receiving something in return.
Obviously, when the contributor doesn't receive any reward
in return the probability of future transactions between the
parties diminishes.

As well, a lack of trust begins to

develop by the disgruntled contributor, thereby increasing
the likelihood of conflict.

For example, when the NDP

government in Ontario passed the Social Contract Act, the
CAW and many public sector unions described the government's
decision as an act of betrayal.

As a result, many labour

organizations not only cut their campaign donations to the
federal party in 1993, they also refused to support the NDP
in Ontario in 1995.

Therefore, a new relationship which

fosters trust and encourages profitable transactions between
the NDP and labour must be created.
As discussed in the introduction of this study, there
are three types of political transactions which can occur
between two or more parties .

First, shares (decisional

elements) which refer to an individual's influence within
the decision making process of the group.

Second,

incumbencies (positional elements) used to describe
contributions which are made with the expectation of
personal reward.

Third, commodities (materiel elements)

which characterizes the exchange of materials (ie. money) as
am instrument for achieving an individual's goals.
According to Goldman's transaction theory, when profitable
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transactions occur cooperation and trust between parties are
enhanced.

The remainder of this chapter, therefore, aims to

construct a new structural model for the NDP which, amongst
other things, encourages profitable transactions between it
and labour to occur.
Throughout this study the NDP has been described as an
integrated party because, with the exception of Quebec,
there is no clear distinction between its provincial and
federal wings.

The NDP is also a mass party.

The major aim

of a mass party is to have a large and active
membership.(53)

Canada's two traditional parties, by

contrast, have been described as confederal in structure.
In other words, the provincial wings operate separately from
the federal party.

Canada's two traditional parties are

also defined as cadre parties.

Unlike mass parties , cadre

parties do not require their members to belong exclusively
to their party.

Moreover, the very concept of membership in

a cadre party is informal and important only for electoral
mobilization.(54)

Whereas the organizational structure of

the traditional parties have led to success, the NDP's
organizational structure has been one of the party's main
weaknesses.
For the federal NDP, its integrated structure has meant
that it has often been criticized for the conduct of
provincial NDP governments.

For example, during the 1993

federal election campaign, various labour organizations
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announced that they were cutting their financial
contributions to the federal party because of the Social
Contract Act passed by the NDP government in Ontario.

The

confederal structure of the Liberals and the Conservatives,
however, have spared them, to a large extent, from this
problem.

Under the leadership of Robert Bourassa, for

instance, the Liberal Party of Quebec won two consecutive
majority governments even though the federal Liberals fared
poorly in Quebec during the same period.

In Manitoba, Gary

Filmon's Conservative Party was able to win its first
majority government despite the unpopularity of the
Conservative

government in Ottawa.

The integrated model has also made it extremely
difficult for the federal NDP to communicate with labour and
other social coalition groups.

Originally the party's

founders believed that the integrated model would ensure
that the NDP would be a centralized party.

However, as

Canada's provincial bureaucracies grew to accommodate the
growing numbers of new government programs, provincial
governments and the parties which formed them grew
substantially.

Consequently, the formation of NDP

governments in Saskatchewan, British Columbia, Manitoba and
Ontario shifted power and prestige from the federal party to
its provincial wings.

For the NDP, then, the decentralizing

pressures of Canadian federalism have made it increasingly
difficult for the NDP to function as an integrated
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party.(55)

Furthermore,

because the party's membership

lists are in the hands of its provincial wings, the federal
NDP does not even know who its members are.

In short, the

federal NDP has lost direct access to its members within the
labour movement, its constituency associations, and other
social coalition groups.
The process of delegate selection for its conventions
has also strengthened the NDP's provincial wings at the
expense of the federal party.

The majority of convention

delegates come from constituency associations that, with the
exception of Quebec, are shared with the provincial
party.(56)

Thus the voting behaviour of convention

delegates, whether it is choosing a leader or changing the
party's program, is often determined by provincial
loyalties.

As well, the NDP's Federal Council, which is

responsible for governing the party between conventions, is
dominated by provincial party table officers and members
selected from provincial party conventions.(57)
Additionally, although affiliated unions usually comprise
approximately 20 percent of convention delegates, their
representation on Federal Council is only 10-12 percent.(58)
The NDP's organizational structure has also made it
difficult for the federal party to formulate and articulate
a coherent political program.

Political differences between

the NDP's provincial wings are reflective of the regional
and economic diversity of Canada.

The political dynamics of
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Saskatchewan, for instance, are different than those of
Ontario.

According to Terry Morley:

"The ambivalent

language of convention resolutions reflected the ambiguous
and diverse impulses among New Democrats."(59)

Furthermore,

as discussed in chapter two, the party's Strategy and
Election Planning Committee (SEPC) had swelled to an
unmanageable number of 50 members by 1993.

Its size

rendered the SEPC ineffective because it was difficult to
please everyone on the committee.

Instead of cooperation

there was serious infighting and confusion amongst SEPC
members.

For example, when the NDP's communications officer

Michael Balagus and SEPC chair Julie Davis had NDP campaign
plans printed in the Ottawa Citizen the CLC's Carol Phillips
wrote to Balagus, "Give me a break.
different meetings..."(60)

We must've been at

Therefore, it is obvious how

the rules and methods used to formulate its policies
dramatically reduced the NDP's ability create a credible
political platform in 1993.
What structural changes should the NDP implement?

The

answer to this question may be found, in part, by examining
other social democratic parties.

The electorally successful

ALP, for example, may offer some answers.

Similarly to the

NDP, the ALP has historically been frustrated by
federalism.(61)

However, unlike the NDP, the ALP has made

two key structural changes.

First, during the 1980s the

national ALP steadily separated itself from its state
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branches, and second, the ALP established a new method for
organizing delegates based upon cross state factional
alliances.(62)

The newly legitimized factions were allowed

to have their own rules for membership, their own
constitutions and their own fee structures within the
A L P . (63)

By permitting factions into the party , the ALP

has in effect created a party which encourages discussion
between various groups and has shifted the very nature of
intra-party debate from regional based concerns to cross
state matters.

Howard Pawley, moreover, points out that

Australia’s trade unions participate in either right or left
factions.(64)

For the NDP, allowing

labour organizations

to participate in various factions would be extremely
valuable. It would finally recognize the fact that labour is
not a monolithic entity nor do labour leaders and their rank
and file members share the same political views.
Allowing factions into the NDP would also recognize the
fact that labour’s role within the party is that of both a
partner and an interest group.

This is because factions

would be permitted to have their own conventions and their
own constitutions while also holding membership with the
NDP.

As well, factional representatives would be permitted

to attend party conventions and participate in the NDP's
major decision-making bodies.

In other words, the relative

autonomy afforded to the factions would allow labour
representatives to voice their concerns freely and without
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fear of expulsion from the party.
Before suggesting, however, that the NDP should model
itself after the ALP, it is important to note that there are
problems associated with factionalism as it exists within
the ALP.

The pre-selection of party candidates, for

instance, has become increasingly dominated by factional
considerations, rather than determined by the qualifications
of the candidates .(65)

As well, there has been a certain

degree of resentment over the role played by the factions
amongst party members who are not involved in factions.(66)
Finally, when in government the ALP's Cabinet selection
process has been mainly determined by factional
representation within the party's caucus.

Therefore, while

the admission of factions into the NDP should be considered,
safeguards must also be made in order to prevent factional
domination.

Representation at NDP conventions and on

Federal Council, for example, would be pre-set to ensure the
numerical supremacy of delegates chosen from the party’s
constituency associations.

In the future, maintaining the

representational supremacy of the constituency associations
is essential if the NDP hopes to balance the interests of
its grass roots supporters with the interests of labour and
other groups.
Although NDP constituency associations would continue
to enjoy representational supremacy, their role within the
decision-making process would be reformed.

Historically it
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has been the constituency association which has formulated
resolutions which were intended to be debated at party
conventions.

Unfortunately, this has meant that NDP

conventions have traditionally been flooded with a wide
array, and sometimes conflicting, set of proposals.

This,

in turn, has made difficult for the party’s Resolutions
Committee to decide which proposals are to be considered and
which proposals are discarded.

This process, then, has not

only angered those constituency associations which have seen
their resolutions abandoned, it has also made it difficult
for the NDP to devise a coherent political program.
The NDP must therefore change the rules which have
dictated how party policy is developed.

Instead of allowing

various local ridings the authority to devise and present
resolutions, the NDP could create a few large regional
policy making bodies divided in the following manner:

1)

Western region (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British
Columbia); Central Region (Ontario and Quebec); and 3)
Eastern Region (including all the Maritime provinces).

one

elected member from each constituency association would be
part of these regional bodies.

The duty of these members

would be to formulate a limited (5 minimum/10 maximum)
number of policy proposals which would then be voted by
their respective constituency associations.

Only those

resolutions accepted by the constituency associations would
be presented to the SEPC at the party's convention.
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SEPC would then be required to develop a political platform
for the party.
The SEPC, for its part, would be dramatically reduced
in size.

Representation on the SEPC would include the

party's leader, its president, one member from each regional
decision making body (total - 3), two factional
representatives and 2 representatives from affiliated union
locals.

Although required to devise a political platform

from the resolutions passed by the regional policy making
bodies, the SEPC would also be permitted to develop its own
policies.

Moreover, elections would be held yearly for all

SEPC members, except for the party's leader, and its
president, to ensure a sufficient degree of accountability.
Obviously, then, there are many ways in which NDPlabour relations can be improved in fashion which would also
help the NDP's electoral competitiveness.
should become a confederal party.

First, the NDP

An independent federal

party equipped with its own constituency associations would
ensure that its members' loyalties lay exclusively with it.
Labour organizations as well as their members would, for the
first time, have direct access to the federal party.

As

well, labour organizations would also have the option of
either joining as an affiliated union or within a recognized
faction.

The introduction of factions would minimize intra

party conflict on the basis of regional allegiances while
creating an atmosphere which encourages open debate.
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Why would labour unions join this new federal party?
They would join because some of the void left by provincial
wing delegates would be filled by labour delegates thereby
giving it a greater voice within the federal party.
Specifically, union representation on the Federal Council
(10-12 percent under the party's present structure) would be
raised in accordance with the number of union delegates
participating at NDP conventions (currently 20-25 percent).
Labour organizations which choose to join a faction with
other individuals and coalition groups would also have
representation on Federal Council and delegate
representation at party conventions. By increasing labour's
presence in the decision making process, the probability for
profitable exchanges to occur between the NDP and labour
would increase greatly.
By implementing all of these proposed structural
changes the NDP will not only have a larger coalition of
supporters, it will also have a larger and loyal grass roots
following.

The federal NDP will then be able to formulate a

credible and electorally competitive political platform
which balances the interests of labour with other groups and
individuals.

Conclusion
Since the 1993 federal election campaign, NDP-labour
relations have been precarious.

The CAW and most public
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sector unions have sought alternatives to the NDP, as a way
to better serve labour's interests.

By contrast, private

sector unions have remained loyal to the NDP.

Within the

NDP there are also divisions with regard to labour's worth
as a political ally.

Although it is difficult to speculate

how the NDP-labour relationship will unfold, it is clear
that neither side has little to gain from a divorce.
The NDP remains as the only political party which
represents labour's interests.

Even in Ontario, where the

public sector unions and the CAW refused to endorse the
party, the Rae government passed Bill 40, employment equity,
and pay equity.

Similarly, in British Columbia, the

Harcourt government implemented numerous pro-labour
measures.

In Saskatchewan, Romanow's NDP government

successfully balanced the province's budget without the
massive public sector layoffs or deep cuts in social
services which occurred in neighbouring Alberta.
Ultimately, it will be up to the CAW and most of the
public sector unions currently disillusioned by the NDP to
make a number of important decisions.

They must decide

whether or not they are prepared to better reflect the
political views of their members.
to

Moreover, they will have

decide whether or not participating in extra-

par liamentary social coalitions will better serve their
interests than by aligning themselves with the NDPAs for the NDP, it must restructure itself in a manner
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which conforms to the realities of Canadian federalism.
NDP must also allow for factions to exist within it.

The

As

well, increased union representation on Federal Council
should reflect union representation on the convention floor.
Enhanced labour participation at all levels of the federal
party would encourage profitable transactions and
consequently greater NDP-labour cooperation.

If the NDP'

follows this direction it can emerge as a significant
political force more capable of challenging the country's
other major parties.
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CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSION
The previous chapters have clearly shown that the
tensions between che NDP and labour have been detrimental to
the interests of both organizations.
concluded

It has also been

that in order to improve its electoral fortunes,

as well as its relationship with labour, the NDP must be
willing to implement a number of structural changes.

Prior

to discussing these proposed structural changes, a brief
reiteration of the key factors which have shaped NDP-labour
relations in the 1990s is necessary.

NDP-Labour Relations:

1990-1995

In 1989, the NDP chose Audrey McLaughlin as its leader.
Although McLaughlin had limited political experience, her
commitment to social policy issues pleased many labour
leaders.

In fact, during the leadership convention

McLaughlin was supported by some of the largest and most
influential labour leaders including, Leo Gerard of the
Steelworkers, Bob White from the CAW (now president of the
CLC), CUPE's president Jeff Rose, and Gordon Wilson from the
O F L . (1)

With McLaughlin as the federal party's leader it

appeared as though NDP-labour relations were about to enter
into a new and more productive era.
The relationship between the NDP and labour, however,
soured in 1993 because of the actions taken by Ontario’s NDP
government.

The Rae government in Ontario had grossly
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underestimated the recession of the early 1990s.

The

Ontario government, faced with shrinking revenues, soon
found itself plagued with massive budgetary deficits and a
skyrocketing debt.

Ontario's fiscal situation became so

serious that the government decided to negotiate a social
contract with public sector unions in an attempt to control
spending.

After failing to reach an agreement with public

sector union leaders, the Rae government legislated a
unilateral roll-back of existing collective agreements.

In

response, public sector union leaders, along with the
country's largest private sector union, the CAW, condemned
the social contract because it infringed on collective
bargaining rights.

The fact that this legislation was

passed by the NDP made it only more difficult for many
labour leaders to comprehend because many trade unionists
felt betrayed by an NDP government which they had helped to
elect in 1990.
Unfortunately for the federal NDP, the rift between
the labour and the Rae government unfolded during a federal
election year.

Indeed, the majority of Canada's labour

organizations supported the federal party.

However,

labour’s support for the NDP in 1993 lacked the enthusiasm
and the dollars associated with past federal election
campaigns.

This is because as an integrated party the

majority of the Federal Party's campaign staff, including
campaign advisors, came from its provincial wings.

As a
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result, many of Ontario's labour organizations found it
difficult to enthusiastically support the federal NDP
because of the actions taken by one of its provincial wings.
Furthermore, the Federal Party's apparent reluctance to
speak out against Rae's social contract further dismayed the
NDP's labour allies.

In

fact, when New Democrat MP Steven

Langdon decided to publicly condemn the social contract, he
was subsequently stripped of his duties as the party's
finance critic for his comments.
On election night, October 25th 1993, the NDP received
a mere 6.9 percent of the popular vote and only nine seats.
In Ontario, the party lost all ten of the seats that it had
won in 1988.

In the West, moreover, the Reform Party

successfully defeated many of the NDP's incumbents.

The

serious decline of the NDP has forced the party and its
traditional labour allies to re-examine their relationship
with one another.

This study has attempted to identify the

problems which have caused NDP-labour relations.

As well,

this study has presented possible solutions to these
problems which would, in effect, increase labour's role
within the NDP.

NDP-Labour Relations:

A New Partnership

Establishing an alternative set of rules which enhances
the effectiveness of NDP-labour relations requires
structural change.

In accordance with Goldman's transaction
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theory, it was concluded that an environment which
encourages profitable transactions between labour and the
NDP must be created.

In order to create an environment

which encourages profitable transactions to occur labour's
participation in the decision making process of the NDP must
be increased.

It was argued that the labour's

representation on the

Federal Council be increased to

reflect the number of labour delegates which attend the
party's conventions.

More importantly, it was argued that

labour's presence be increased within a smaller, and more
powerful, Strategy and Election Planning Committee.
Furthermore, the NDP would have to become a confederal
party.

This would enable the party, for the first time, to

have a direct link with labour and its other supporters.
Moreover, by becoming a confederal party, the NDP would have
its own federal constituency associations and access to
membership lists.

More importantly, by having its own

constituency associations, the federal NDP would have a
membership loyal to it, rather than a membership which is
divided by provincial loyalties.
As a confederal party, the NDP would be financially
independent from its provincial wings.

With its own

membership lists it could solicit its supporters directly
for funds.

Moreover, for the first time, the Federal Party

could fully benefit from the rules of the Elections Expenses
Act, which allows federal parties to issue tax exemption
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receipts for political donations.
Finally, the NDP should also allow for factions to be
admitted into the party.

Allowing factions into the NDP,

would encourage open debate on important and sometimes
controversial issues.

It would also allow another avenue

for social coalition groups and labour organizations to
participate in the NDP.

In short, the removal of the

provincial presence, combined with the admission of factions
into the NDP, would encourage and enhance the party's
ability to formulate a credible national program.
Clearly, then, the proposed structural changes are
intended to maximize the potential benefits associated with
NDP-labour ties.

More significantly, the proposals attempt

to accomplish this objective in a manner which will also
improve the NDP's electoral chances.
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ENDNOTES
1

.

Audrey McLaughlin, A Women's Place: My Life in Politics
(Toronto: Macfarlane Walter and Ross, 1992), p.66.
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